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Interesting piece by @JGForsyth, but it seems to represent just one perspective inside HMG (perhaps that of CO and HMT, but not necessarily No10). My understanding is that key players in No10 are far less bullish about prospects for a deal. (THREAD) https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/a-brexit-deal-is-within-touching-distance-87wczflz6">https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/a...
1. I understand that No10 are adamant that they won& #39;t drop the controversial clauses 42-45 from the UKIM Bill. In their view, these clauses are about protecting "essential UK interests" against EU over-reach. Braverman& #39;s gutsy speech in the Commons yday spelled out this view.
2. There& #39;s a big trouble ahead with the EU, but legal countermeasures aren& #39;t seen as a political risk. The view is that if the EU infracts Govt under NIP and takes it to the ECJ, this will be a fight btw "a sovereign Parliament v European judges". Speaks to the core constituency.
3. There& #39;s more to come. Finance Bill will introduce measures protecting GB-NI trade. I expect this will set more hares running in Bxl and EU capitals, because the perceived risk to "the integrity of the single market" via GB-NI trade is greater than in the opposite direction.
4. And there& #39;re also ongoing concerns inside No10 about UK courts continuing to interpret UK law in line with future ECJ case-law due to "muscle memory" of judges; so we shouldn& #39;t be surprised if there& #39;s another surprise coming, this time perhaps from MoJ or the AG& #39;s office.
5. On the deal with the EU, the view is that the UK needs to be seen to want a deal, but a deal is possible only if a) the EU drops its state aid ask and b) legal text can be done in the next few wks. There& #39;s a push for negotiating tunnel to demonstrate determination for a deal.
6. My understanding is technical talks are there just to fill the void. Little space to maneuver in key areas; a deal seen as feasible only if politicians instruct teams to move. James& #39;s piece is right that the landing zone for fisheries is clear; always going to be the case. But
7. The big, really big question is state aid. A common mistake is to assume that No10& #39;s opposition is merely to alignment on EU state aid legislation and frameworks; it is a much deeper hostility to any constraints that would bind a sovereign UK in the future.
8. NI Protocol has served as a warning to No10 ; Johnson signed up to it last autumn under pressure to get the WA over the line and to save his political future, but Art 10 of the Protocol seen as a big mistake. One of the genuine drivers behind UKIMB was to rectify this.
9. No10& #39;s latest line on state aid is that they need to consult business before decisions abt future regime. It& #39;s used to support their argument in the neg room that & #39;we can& #39;t pre-empt outcome with binding constraints in EU FTA& #39;. Sharma met w/ business this week to talk abt this.
10. Also understand the PM isn& #39;t very engaged with the negotiations; all decisions are in the hands of the spad trio of Frost/Lewis/Cummings. They& #39;re all in agreement on the fundamentals for a deal: (1) nothing that binds the UK in the future; (2) the agmt must be done this year.
11. Both premises are very challenging. On (1): it& #39;s clear the EU will be reluctant to sign a FTA without binding state aid rules. There& #39;s some Whitehall chit-chat about dialing up the offer to WTO-plus commitment + arbitration + unilateral tariffs if subsidies deemed harmful.
12. But there& #39;s a growing recognition that technical talks can& #39;t get us there; Barnier doesn& #39;t have the mandate to agree to anything less than the UK signing up to a domestic state aid regime + independent enforcement. Neither No10 nor BEIS are ready to commit to this right now.
13. It& #39;s difficult to see movement on state aid without political intervention btw Johnson/Macron/Merkel. Understand FR has been anxious abt anything less than alignment on EU state aid rules; DE more pragmatic but clear about protections against the UK "free-riding" on EU rules.
14. And, since the EU has made clear that FTA will be conditional on Govt dropping the difficult parts of the UKIM Bill, I expect that their view will only solidify when the Finance Bill lands in a few weeks& #39; time. Difficult to swallow for the EU, & difficult to abandon for No10.
15. On (2): practical feasibility of a deal seen as a real challenge. There& #39;s been varied progress across 10 negs streams. In some areas, legal text can be finalised in a week/two. In others, there& #39;re too many outstanding technical issues to get through without joint legal text.
16. All this paints a less optimistic picture than James& #39;s piece. He& #39;s right that there& #39;re are drivers for a deal inside HMG. But they don& #39;t come from No10, but other parts of govt, esp CO/HMT. Gove worried abt no-deal impacts on the Union; Sunak abt the border and the economy.
17. The PM might be keen to salvage a deal. But I expect that, if there& #39;s going to be a deal, it& #39;ll be as a result of a fight inside HMG: between the trio Frost/Lewis/Cummings (against deep concessions with every fibre of their being) and moderate Cabinet members and parly party.
18. Until then, both sides will say, & #39;we really want a deal& #39;. Both need to be seen as constructive if the talks were to fail. But we shouldn& #39;t be under any illusion that there& #39;ll be concessions on the fundamentals anytime soon. The deal is not without touching distance. (END)
Just going to add this: there’re always briefings to the press before crucial Cabinet meetings. XS Cttee meets on Monday to decide on the next steps for negs; it’s to be expected that ministers/spads will brief out their lines to their favourite journalists.
