Great paper by Douven on IBE (vs Bayesianism). An ergodicity argument against Bayes à la @ole_b_peters and @nntaleb—Bayes may be "optimal", but only because it does well on exponentially unlikely sequences. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Igor_Douven/publication/282945311_Inference_to_the_Best_Explanation_What_Is_It_And_Why_Should_We_Care/links/5623a07508aea35f2686845c/Inference-to-the-Best-Explanation-What-Is-It-And-Why-Should-We-Care.pdf">https://www.researchgate.net/profile/I...

Douven& #39;s paper summarizes lovely recent work he& #39;s done with Schupbach on the *psychology* of explanation-making, but pulls no punches in arguing that non-Bayesian updating may be normatively (i.e., philosophically) better, and not just a heuristic or shortcut.

Would be curious to hear @nescio13& #39;s impressions (and digressions) on Douven& #39;s argument here, which is claims to rescue the old-school Inference to Best Explanation literature of van Frassen, Harman, et al—even Popper!

Or @davidbkinney—I see you liking this thread, David. Another great feature of Douven& #39;s paper is that he doesn& #39;t just punt IBE to the prior, but asks if we have good evidence (or normative justification) for having it affect how we update in the presence of information.