Read on Twitter
Good evening twitter. I promised I’d come back to the sinking of the RFN cruiser Moskva (Pennant no 121) once more info were to become available. Here I am now. A thread reflecting on the most severe naval loss since the Falklands Wars: what happened, and its consequences. https://twitter.com/alessionaval/status/1514529987101175811
What do we know now about those dramatic moments of 13-14 April 2022?
A couple of important preliminary observations:
1. The ship is now at the bottom of the BS (Black Sea), therefore short of efforts to reach the ship with dedicated tools, details will remain limited;
A couple of important preliminary observations:
1. The ship is now at the bottom of the BS (Black Sea), therefore short of efforts to reach the ship with dedicated tools, details will remain limited;
For example: in 2015, the remains of the Battleship Musashi were found and as a result of that discovery some of the fatal last moments of the ships became clearer - this is often the case. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31724995
2. The location of the ship at the time of the fatal engagement doesn’t suggest the ship cannot be accessed with modern equipment. Indeed given sensible materials on it RU might rush to recover whatever possible - and it might lead to additional photos and precious materials.
Indeed, recent reports suggested the RFN was to deploy one of the oldest serving rescue vessels to the site of sinking. Besides the age of the ship inviting comments of all sorts, this is a militarily important mission given the location of the cruiser: http://www.hisutton.com/Russian-Navy-Moskva-Cruiser-Wreck.html
Now- back to the question. What do we know about the sinking? Images and videos emerged since the sinking have not lead main outlets like the BBC to offer conclusive reconstructions of events. Still, I think it is possible to make an informed evaluation: ( https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61103927)
Experts such as @DAlperovitch @CovertShores @navalhistorian have offered over the past few days continuous and very informative updates and analysis of photos. See, for example: https://twitter.com/CovertShores/status/1515835497867878404 and https://twitter.com/DAlperovitch/status/1515955042423087114
Among my favourite reflections, two may be of help to many others to reflect upon the technical analysis, and the broader context: @johnkonrad https://twitter.com/johnkonrad/status/1515837566356008961 (former) and the ever insightful @pinstripedline https://twitter.com/pinstripedline/status/1515301957350666243 (latter)
Taken altogether I think there is a very good probability that the original Ukrainian and Russian stories are very compatible:
a. Missiles hit the warship;
b. Fires onboard ensue;
c. Sensitive storage areas are either reached by fires, or exploded upon contact;
d. Fires spread;
a. Missiles hit the warship;
b. Fires onboard ensue;
c. Sensitive storage areas are either reached by fires, or exploded upon contact;
d. Fires spread;
e. the Moskva’s fate is sealed.
The time of sinking was neither unusual, nor incompatible with the above.
What else can we surmise about it?
This is where things get complicated. A number of factors might have favoured UKR attack and undermined the ship’s survival.
The time of sinking was neither unusual, nor incompatible with the above.
What else can we surmise about it?
This is where things get complicated. A number of factors might have favoured UKR attack and undermined the ship’s survival.
Among the most important to continue to keep an eye on:
1. Operational security - seemingly poor, with ineffective risk assessment, and predictable patters of area deployment;
2. Layered defence -seemingly ineffective or poorly manned;
3. Damage control -again quite ineffective;
1. Operational security - seemingly poor, with ineffective risk assessment, and predictable patters of area deployment;
2. Layered defence -seemingly ineffective or poorly manned;
3. Damage control -again quite ineffective;
In this regard, interviews with some of MIAs families suggest crew members not from seasoned stock, which in turn could lead to some of the problems above: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/18/moskva-warship-need-answers-relatives-missing-crew-russia?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other
Additional information presented by RU suggests inconsistencies with number of crews and dynamics of events, but it doesn’t invalidate observations above: https://edition.cnn.com/2022/04/22/europe/moskva-russia-casualties-intl/index.html
As you can see - in this thread I have not included any of the silly RU propaganda claims/videos. One thing that keeps coming back to me is the assumption that the Moskva was operating at full crew numbers - I would not be sure of it from the known dynamics.
What general observations one can make about the sinking of the Moskva then, ten days after the events?
1. The loss of strategically significant, since the extent to which RU can make plans to use the sea to support advances in the south remains limited;
1. The loss of strategically significant, since the extent to which RU can make plans to use the sea to support advances in the south remains limited;
2. Denial capabilities, including land based missile cruises and, crucially, mines, will continue to hamper RU inshore operations;
3. RFN support strikes are conducted more under operational risks, but unlikely to stop because of the loss of the Moskva.
Defence HQ map here:
3. RFN support strikes are conducted more under operational risks, but unlikely to stop because of the loss of the Moskva.
Defence HQ map here:
The war at sea and from the sea didn’t end with Moskva sinking. It shall continue. And the story will gain more details. But for now, the BS is not likely to become any easier to navigate for Russia. Indeed, the opposite might very well be true.
Thank you for reading!
Thank you for reading!
