Read on Twitter
There is evidence that the elite in Russia is rallying around Putin, including those who originally expressed misgivings about the invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing war.
Is this unity durable – and how might it impact decision-making?
A thread. 1/?
Is this unity durable – and how might it impact decision-making?
A thread. 1/?
This excellent post by @faridaily_ – translated by @ichbinilya and @lizafokht – shows how "Putin’s dream of a consolidation among the Russian elite has come true", as sanctions have convinced many members of the elite that the West is out to get them. 2/? https://faridaily.substack.com/p/now-were-going-to-fck-them-all-whats?s=r
One plausible goal of sanctions might be to provoke splits within the elite, but it looks – for the moment, at least – that sanctions have, rather, brought elite groups closer together in their opposition to the West. 3/?
And, as @LucanWay notes, this is a dynamic seen in regimes beyond Russia: "Sense of existential threat is a powerful source of regime durability in revolutionary regimes I have studied." 4/? https://twitter.com/LucanWay/status/1510609904364658688
But how long will this last? "Rallying 'round the flag" effects aren't indefinite, even if they can be sustained by a number of factors, including media control and reshaping people's emotional connection to the state and their identities. 5/?
By the way, the book "Putin v. the People" by @samagreene and @gbrunc does a brilliant job, among other things, of looking into the "rallying 'round the flag" effect after the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014. 6/? https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300238396/putin-v-people/
But back to 2022. Elite consolidation in Russia after the 24 February invasion, and in the face of sanctions, may well both align elite preferences on certain issues *and* incentivise people not to make public their policy differences for fear of being labelled a traitor. 7/?
A key issue here is whether all policy areas will see this increased elite homogeneity. Message discipline may well be tightest re: the ongoing war, although not perfect – see Medinsky vs. Kadyrov, as in this piece by @Andrew__Roth and @PjotrSauer. 8/? https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/02/who-has-putins-ear-inside-the-presidents-inner-circle
But what about policy areas less obviously connected to Russia's war on Ukraine? There are a large number of socio-economic policy areas that are not directly connected, even if the shift to a war/crisis footing infuses many areas with the logic of "Fortress Russia". 9/?
There are many policy areas in which elite actors and groups often clash, given their different preferences. See, for example, the dispute over crypto-currencies between the Russian Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank. 10/? https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2022/02/18/910000-zakonoproekti-o-zaprete-kriptovalyut
In fact, my own research focuses on elite factionalism in Russia and its impact on law-making. My basic point is that heated, bitter disputes between elite actors are more widespread than often appreciated – and ... 11/? https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0010414018797941
... that these sometimes spill over into the parliamentary phase of law-making in the national legislature, the Federal Assembly. And that means that, even if parliamentarians mostly rubberstamp initiatives from the executive (the government and the presidency) ... 12/?
... interesting things can happen during the legislative phase of policy-making, like significant amendments to bills, which reflect the resolution of intra-executive policy disputes that are nodded through by legislators. 13/? https://theconversation.com/russia-new-research-shows-even-authoritarian-regimes-struggle-to-pass-laws-104084
That makes the Federal Assembly a rare window onto often-hidden processes between elite actors. (I should say that Russian journalism on these cases has been crucial for my work. So, given the crackdown on independent media, we may know much less – for the moment.) 14/?
It is plausible, though, that, in the short term, when policy disputes are reduced by the need for a common response to sanctions – or when the optics of policy disputes jar with the desired optics of a unified elite – that we see fewer such disputes. But... 15/?
... I can't see this lasting for too long. And part of that relates to the availability of resources. There is likely an inverse relationship between the availability of resources (e.g., money to be spent by different federal ministries) and the likelihood of disputes. 16/?
As the economic impact of sanctions are more keenly felt – by both the elite and the Russian people – there will be fewer resources available to satisfy competing groups. And that may well begin to challenge the current unity seen within the elite. 17/?
The crucial question, then, will be whether these policy disputes have the capacity to grow into broader regime-challenging disputes. 18/?
And my research on the often-dismissed State Duma – the lower chamber of the Federal Assembly – suggests that we might get clues as to the unity of the elite by looking at the law-making process. 19/?
