There's a bit of confusion evolving about the stance of the wider Arab world on Ukraine, and alignments with Western states and Russia. Keeping in mind it's a bit foolhardy to try to account for the policies of 22 separate nation-states, here are some trends to understand:

1. don't confuse official government statements (or lack thereof) with popular opinion. To put it bluntly, it's extremely difficult to gauge popular opinion in the Arab world, because of such widespread restrictions on freedom of speech, particularly on politics.

2. Don't rely too much on social media. It's a bubble in the freest of places; and given the amount of disinformation being peddled at the moment, combined with scores of troll farms, one ought to be very careful about being too definitive about what Arabs writ large think.

3. On the popular level, just as an FYI, I've seen very little difference in the range of opinions on Ukraine/Russia among Arabs, as compared to what I have seen in the UK and the US. The difference is the emphasis of different positions, not the existence of them.

4. So, yes, you'll see a lot of solidarity with Ukraine among Arabs; a lot of calling of racism in terms of how some western media is covering it; a lot of calling out of double standards in terms of how Syria suffered much more than this; etc. Much like in the West.

5. On the political elite level; apart from the Syrian regime, which has been vigorously pro-Putin, there is no Arab state machinery that is aligned with Russia in any real sense. Every other Arab state has decided its interests lie in developing close relations with the West.

6. This is despite a lot of the antipathy you might find in the Arab world (both on the popular level and the leadership level) vis-a-vis DC or other western capitals. They're not trying to pivot to Moscow. Their prized relationships are with DC, London, Paris, Brussels, etc.

7. Generally speaking, these Arab states are either 'modernising' (in terms of tech, bureaucracy - not necessarily in terms of rights/freedoms) or trying to. And in their conception of what 'modernising' is, modernisation is deeply tied to Western states.

8. All that being said, it does not mean that these Arab states are hostile to Russia. Most if not all of them are not. In Russia, they generally see a big global power that continues to try to intervene in their region, and sometimes they support that kind of intervention.

9. More than that, in Russia these Arab states might also see a power that they can 'flirt' with, in order to benefit directly from such a relationship, but also send cynical messages particularly to DC. (DC pretty much - correctly - dismisses the possibility of any seriousness.)

10. There is also the growing sense that the West is not a reliable partner, and that has been building for years, from 2011 onwards. Some of these Arab leaders expected the West to stand by autocrats like Mubarak (which frankly would have been consistent with Western history).

11. Many of these Arab states also see how the West failed to hold the line in Syria; or for Crimea; and how it abandoned Afghanistan in a truly embarrassing fashion. None of this means these Arab leaders want to pivot to Moscow; only that they want more flexibility and options.

12. And frankly, many of these Arab leaders felt they can have their cakes, and eat them too, when it came to Western ties and Russian 'flirting'. It's why nearly all of them failed to officially back Ukraine in the first day or so of the invasion, with some notable exceptions.

13. Having said that, Western messages have now been received loud and clear in most Arab capitals: the blaming 'both sides' thing won't work. We expect you to stand with your actual allies. Pretty much every Arab state then signed up to the UNGA resolution condemning Russia.

14. At the same time, still have some attempts to use this situation. MBS, Saudi's de-facto ruler, wants Biden's recognition of him as such, before he agrees to pump more crude to lower the price of oil that has surged since Russia attacked Ukraine. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-crown-prince-plays-oil-card-quest-us-recognition-2022-03-03/

15. None of this is going to go down badly in Arab public opinion, even if they disagree with all of these regimes. A lot of particularly American policies are rejected in the region, especially when it comes to supporting the Israelis over the occupation of Palestinians.

16. But we'll see likely more twists and turns. There's a lot more that could be said, but this thread is already rather long.