So...International Security Twitter hasn't exactly had a good week. My reaction to the debate over whether the US should abandon Taiwan, speaking partly as a Taiwanese American scholar of international security.

First, the Glaser FA piece was TERRIBLE: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington-avoiding-tough-questions-taiwan-and-china

If you haven't yet, read @BDHerzinger's excellent reply in FP: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/03/taiwan-policy-us-china-abandon/

As well as @tshugart3's analysis of the military balance: https://twitter.com/tshugart3/status/1388214879165710336

But @MMazarr warns that voices like Glaser are being shouted down, that we need a richer debate: https://twitter.com/MMazarr/status/1390325928128139265

Fine, but here's the issue: What's the *positive* case for abandoning Taiwan? What does the US want to get *for* its acceptance of CH control of TW?

With 1970s CH-US rapprochement, the US got a partner against Russia in the Cold War. There were offsetting benefits for dumping TW and maybe a quasi-coherent "vision"/strategy reassuring other partners of the US' broader policy trajectory.

We don't have anything similar today.

[NOTE: Other partners weren't necessarily reassured. South Korea was deeply concerned that thawing US-CH relations and the Nixon Doctrine meant the US was going to abandon Seoul.]

Maybe you don't need a positive case. Simply avoiding war (Glaser's goal) is a good goal!

But wo a positive case, two things become harder. 1. Where does the US draw the line? Glaser tries to do that with Japan and SK (poorly, as @BDHerzinger and @tshugart3 demonstrate).

If you can't articulate your BATNA, you're very susceptible to salami slicing tactics. Opponents constantly push until you figure out what you stand for. https://twitter.com/Kuorum1/status/1388120343026364417

2. Your allies doubt your intentions. Agenda-setting is a powerful tool in both domestic and international politics. That requires a positive vision.

Glaser's weakest pts were his predictions about JP and ROK reactions.

He says: "Even if it ended its commitment to Taiwan, the United States could preserve its credibility with Japan and South Korea. These allies would no doubt understand that Taiwan was less important to the United States than they are..."

But not every part of the US-JP/ROK commitment is of higher value than TW. Maritime access? Glaser threw the SCS under the bus. Senkaku Islands? Doubtful. ADIZ? Be serious.

[The ROK was arguably a greater US priority in the 70s than TW, and still Prez Park worried about what US abandonment of TW signaled for the US-ROK relationship.]

This prediction flies in the face of US-JP recent inclusion of TW in security discussions, the first time this has happened since 1969. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/16/u-s-japan-joint-leaders-statement-u-s-japan-global-partnership-for-a-new-era/

If you want a richer debate, the key question is where the US should draw the line in a way consistent with its other regional commitments. What is the positive case/vision?

Blake et al have given clear responses. Still waiting to hear about that from Glaser and other restrainers.

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