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So, I don& #39;t agree with everything here, but I& #39;m also not nearly as negative about it as the first round of Twitter responses I& #39;m seeing. Why? A short 
https://abs.twimg.com/emoji/v2/... draggable="false" alt="🧵" title="Thread" aria-label="Emoji: Thread"> https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2021-05-05/dont-call-nigeria-failed-state">https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/...
I once had a good-natured argument with a senior Nigerian (US-based) academic along these lines, where I was the cynical one. What he argued is that most people& #39;s assessment of Nigeria today come down to what they think the goal of the post-1978 constitutional order was. 2/
If the goal of the & #39;78 constitution was to really bring Nigeria together, build "nation-ness," and create the institutional basis for vibrant democratic/good government, well, you& #39;re pretty disappointed (even despite the survey evidence about moderating ethnic intolerance). 3/
The federal character, in particular, has been a total disaster. If anything, it& #39;s deepened elite and mass ethnic/regional divisions in politics, and make many kinds of political compromise much harder. My (non-Nigerian, non-stakeholder) view is that it needs major reform. 4/
Nor has the post-& #39;78 order solved what I view as the biggest political issue in Nigeria today--the structural barriers to ordinary, working-class people across the country building a sense of solidarity and mobilizing around their experiences of state violence and corruption. 5/n
However (and this is what my colleague argued), if the goal of the & #39;78 bargain was simply to avoid the big bad--another civil war--hasn& #39;t it been wildly successful? I don& #39;t totally agree, the level of ambient violence across the country is a steep price to pay for no war. 6/n
But it& #39;s also the case that in general, the kind of elite, status quo solidarities the post-& #39;78 order has been good at producing have largely prevented regionally limited conflicts from becoming "existential" threats to the state. 7/n
Now, I& #39;m open to the possibility that the newest wave of criminal banditry & pastoralist/farmer conflict are in fact existential threats to the existing order. I& #39;ve even written as much in a chapter coming out later this year in an edited volume w/ @mambayyahouse. 8/n
And I surely don& #39;t agree w/the FA article& #39;s argument that the rise of groups like Amotekun is maybe a good thing. It& #39;s super not a good thing, and the language being used by its political supporters is scary (as is the language used by some pastoralist groups, to be clear). 9/n
Ultimately, my fear & cynicism come down to the possibility that the status quo not only produces huge amounts of violence that primarily effect Nigeria& #39;s most vulnerable citizens, but that the political status quo prevents real policy reforms that might fix things. 10/
The FA article also mentions the NLTP in an optimistic light, as something that might reduce tensions/violence and lead to reconciliation. But it (or some other better policy initiative) can& #39;t move forward meaningfully under the current political status quo. Why? 11/
Because the nature of the post-& #39;78 institutions incentivize treating every major policy tackling a regional problem as a federal character thing, as a giveaway to undeserving people in another region. 12/
So there& #39;s never a real investment in rebuilding the NE (the PINE involved less money than my university gets from the Ohio state budget), or in dealing with climate change and infrastructure that might ease farmer/herder tensions. And conflicts continue. 13/end
