It’s striking to me that the squabbling among the US armed services about their roles in a Pacific conflict is taking place around the anniversary of the Falklands War. The fundamental challenges in the Falklands are hugely illustrative for a fight in the Pacific.

A regional power with significant A2/AD capabilities attempting a fait accompli on a contested island in its backyard sounds like a familiar scenario. The technology evolves and the range rings expand, but the fundamental concepts remain instructive.

It’s worth remembering that for a distant global power to restore the internationally recognized political order on this small island, the national maritime enterprise (not just the navy) had to undertake a Herculean endeavor simply to have the JTF arrive at the fight.

The navy and air force had to constantly fight for control of the air and sea space, and arguably never achieved true superiority in either domain until the war was coming to its conclusion. Argentina inflicted serious damage to UK maritime and air forces throughout the conflict.

There’s no strong argument to be made that naval and air power alone could have achieved the political objective. Could the navy and RAF have slugged out a long fight of attrition until Argentina agreed to withdraw? Maybe, but likely not at a cost acceptable to the UK.

Winning the conflict took putting boots on the ground where the people lived, as others have pointed out. Argentina didn’t claim the islands by establishing a naval blockade and calling it a day - they landed troops, took Government House, and made the front pages.

Likewise, reclaiming the islands for the UK took ground troops. This doesn’t diminish the role the navy or air force played. No ships, no air cover = no invasion. This operation was as joint as they come.

It’s worth noting that the ground campaign was marked by close combat and *long foot movements* - a cautionary tale for an American army that currently hand-waves endurance and stamina as key components of physical fitness.

Ultimately, the war was won by putting troops on the ground. It’s hard to imagine a scenario where we don’t need that option credibly available. That option is not credibly available without the lift and penetration to get there - capabilities mostly resident outside the Army.

The Army is investing a lot of money in the penetration piece, which has drawn criticism from the other services. Frankly, as an infantryman, I don’t care who’s delivering the effects and creating the space for my element to maneuver, I care that it’s happening when I need it to.

I’m also an infantryman who happens to be aware that our merchant fleet - the one that carries my ammunition, tourniquets, and Rip-Its - is in rough shape at the moment. And that’s before enemy contact. Ask the British grunts how they felt about the Atlantic Conveyor going down.

My point is that army leaders need to be farsighted enough to support a recapitalization of our maritime services, and navy and air force leaders need to be less quick to write the Army out of a Pacific conflict. We don’t need to point to WWII - we have a much more recent example

It’s an imperfect analogy, as most are. People will line up around the block under this thread to point out blindingly obvious ways that the Falklands are different from Taiwan, the Philippines, the Senkakus, etc., etc.

But from a military standpoint, it illustrates the fundamental roles of the joint services in a distant island conflict. Members of one service parochially writing off the vital contributions of the others is silly and counterproductive.