Did Ethiopia acquire long range air defense system (HQ-9 (FD-2000) or S-300)?

First of all, I would like to thank all the those who helped me in the analysis and verifying the image, directly or indirectly.

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@MihajlovicMike, verifying the image & supported me with AD information.
@Alex_Kuimova, provided figures about Ethiopian arms transfer and suppliers.
@TheIntelLab, verifying the image.
@TheEgyAnalysis verifying the image & editing the thread.
@vcdgf555 verifying the image.

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In 24 April 2021, I spotted the location using (Google Earth), coordinates: 11.278603756067929, 35.08422485841116 , the imagery date is 22 Nov 2020, the image resolution is not clear but after analysis and verification we can say:

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1- Over 80% Unit-02 it is Kolchuga passive sensor EW.
2- Over 90% Unit-03 it is Pantsir.
3- For Unit-01, the opinions were different, 50% HQ-9 (FD-2000) launcher, 33.3% S-300 launcher and 16.7% for HQ-6 launcher.

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If we are going to narrow the options for (Unit-01), we can say it’s for long-range launcher based on approximate dimensions by 83.3%, as both the HQ-9 (FD-2000) & the S-300 have similarities in TELs specifications,

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despite there is no registered arms deal for the Ethiopian (HQ-9 (FD-2000) or S-300), and missing other (HQ-9 (FD-2000) or S-300) components in the image.

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-No registered arms deal for the Ethiopian (HQ-9 (FD-2000) or S-300)
According to SIPRI Imports of major arms: Ethiopia (1996-2020) data, I noticed that the arms imports for Ethiopia were dropping since 2013 till 2017 and then increased slightly in 2018 and 2019,

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which was really strange for a country that have tensions with the neighbors and may have potential wars.
So, if the potential (HQ-9 (FD-2000) or S-300) deal was not registered or detected, this means that the figures are might be manipulated and there were unregistered

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arms deals by Ethiopia in the mentioned period.

-Missing (HQ-9 (FD-2000) or S-300) components in the site.
From time to time, I’m checking Ethiopian SAM sites specially around the GERD, I noticed the following setup patterns in Ethiopian Air Defense units or sites,

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random, no fortifications and constantly rotating & switching sites. (confirmed by @MihajlovicMike and @TheIntelLab)
Switching positions for air defense units and hiding other components is essential in air defense tactics, and for sure the Ethiopian air defense will

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hide or camouflage most of their SAM sites or components around the GERD.

-Who supplied the long-range air defense system to Ethiopia?
If it is HQ-9 (FD-2000), for sure it’s China, but if it’s the S-300 we have a lot of nominees.

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Matching SIPRI Imports of major arms: Ethiopia (1996-2020) data & S-300 operators, we can say the one of the following countries may supplied Ethiopia with the S-300 (Belarus – Bulgaria – Kazakhstan – Russia – Ukraine).

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By excluding countries that cannot carry out S-300 sales operations as a result of defense needs or special political and military relationship with Russia, and according to recent arms exporting countries to Ethiopia since 2010.

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We can minimize the nominees to Russia and Ukraine, but Russia always announced most of their arms deals as they did before in the Pantsir 2018-2019, so Ukraine might be the potential supplier, which raise a lot of questions of how and when and if there was a middle man?

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-What could the (HQ-9(FD-2000) or S-300) add to the Ethiopian AD system?

Quoting from @MihajlovicMike :
“It looks like serious business – multilayered air defense. I wouldn't be surprised if the launchers soon will be camouflaged in the forest (if they are not already).”

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(HQ-9 (FD-2000) or S-300) is a strategic long range air defense system, it’s used to protect strategic targets, like the GERD.
The existence of (HQ-9 (FD-2000) or S-300) gives the Ethiopian air defense the ability to apply multilayered air defense,

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this mean that Ethiopian Air defense have the ability to engage and detect threats on different ranges, long range threats by the (HQ-9 (FD-2000) or S-300), medium range (SA-3) and short range (Pantsir, AAA & MANPADS).

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The overlapping GERD SAM sites and other AD units can provide artillery protection & point defense, not to mention the EW capabilities like Kolchuga and other radar systems for detecting and tracking

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-Conclusion
If the AD has HQ-9 or S-300 & a Multilayered AD, will it be able to provide sufficient protection for the GERD?
Based on the findings mentioned in the thread alone, it seems like the Ethiopian side will not be able to defend GERD from complex air strikes.

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I will quote from @MihajlovicMike the following:
“The proximity of the border allows the attacker to use the Sudanese airspace and launch missiles from there. For Ethiopian AD, it can't react before the missiles are already in the Ethiopian airspace which is

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a significant disadvantage. They don't have strategic depth and any preemptive attack on the airplanes in the Sudanese airspace is basically open aggression.”

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