I’ve been feeling for a while that I should mention some stuff about Afghanistan.

A thread:

So we have this deal; which is nothing more than a smokescreen for the US (et al) withdrawing after completely failing in their objectives

/1

Don’t gimme that “oh they sorted out AQ” rubbish - they did that in ten minutes in ‘01.

I’m talking about their aims once they decided to go down the expansion around the country, developmenty, governancey, women rights, counter narco, counterinsurgency type aims (frm c2004)

/2

These aims were totally unmet.

Why?

/3

Well, primarily, these aims were not met because the US (and their allies) understood the conflict in Afghanistan as a binary war between the Afg gov/coalition vs the Taliban.

But that was not what it was.

/4

Afghanistan is (currently) at the 43 year point in a multi focal civil war. This is a piece of conflict studies terminology that means that there were lots of civil wars going on at the same time

/5

And most of these mini wars are going on between individuals and families and tribes, over things like land and water and feuds and drugs and all this other stuff that was nothing to do with the gov-tb framing.

/6

However this framing is important because it allows local actors to paint their actions as part of a grand narrative, and to argue for resources from outside actors in order to fund their local fights.

/7

Back to the “deal”.

The Taliban (leadership in Doha) asserted that they would stop Afghan territory being used for terrorism.

But they can’t promise that because they don’t and never will control all Afghan territory.

/8

Afghans who are fighting each other are only tangentially or temporarily aligned to the TB/Afg Gov.

Once the TB get close to government this will become clear - they cannot control the violence because most people are fighting for personal or local reasons

/9

(Remember it is much easier to pump up violence than to dampen it down)

/10

So what will we see?

- the US (etc) will bugger off (actually they won’t, a huge amount will carry on under the surface for this pres term).
- but this effort won’t be enough to keep the government on the road fully. Inevitably ‘the Taliban’ (read: anyone not the gov)…

/11

(Cont)

- … will take control of more territory.
- but this will mean they will fracture. Let’s not even talk about the local village to village shit. The networks that make up the Taliban (the Mansoors, the Hawqanis etc.): what is their plan for government.

/12

What is their plan to share the smuggling / meth trade? And how do they balance this with international recognition (and development funding)? Etc. There are a million questions like this….

/13

When I was hanging out in Helmand, once word kept coming up: mafia. It was applied equally to all in power, whether government or tb or whatever.

Well - we all know how hard it is to get different mafia families to come together. Afg is in for a rough ride

/14

In conclusion:

- The US misunderstood everything (along with about 99.9% of commentators). This extends to their exit deal.
-The TB leadership are deluded - their ‘movement’ will become weaker the closer it gets to government as different interests within centrifuge.

/15

- The local war over drugs, feuds, land, water, etc. will continue
- The Chinese, who have real interests in Afg (Islamists, mining, OBOR), have a choice - if they have any sense they will stay a million miles away.

/16

Really the last fucking hope is a UN trusteeship, led and staffed by Islamic nations, and paid for by the rich.
Ultimately Afg is going to fall into china’s orbit but America should be rejoicing this and trying to help it along.

/17 and ENDS