1/8 Efforts to oppress citizens and erode individuals' rights to privacy, as we see here, are a great validator of Trezor's open-source philosophy. Since the beginning, we have designed Trezor (both in hardware and software) to be as open as possible. https://twitter.com/VICE/status/1387808904399269889

2/8 Suppose a three-letter agency asked us to add a secret hardware or software backdoor to Trezor. The reply is that it's not possible because everybody would immediately see that we've added something which doesn't belong there.

3/8There are thousands of security experts watching our every move, auditing every change in the code. This acts as a perfect failsafe mechanism and no one would use the compromised version.

4/8 When it comes to extracting secrets from the device, there is no such thing as 100% secure hardware. All hardware can be hacked; it's just a matter of resources and motivation.

5/8 That's why we came up with the so-called BIP39 passphrase, which is a final layer of encryption that is not stored on the device at all. Only a user with a device and knowledge of the right passphrase can access the funds.

6/8 Even if a three-letter agency gets their hands on your device and extracts the passphrase-encrypted secret from it, they still cannot seize your coins unless you give them the corresponding passphrase.

7/8 BIP39 passphrases also grant plausible deniability: there is no such thing as an incorrect passphrase, and each passphrase will lead to a different, valid wallet. With that in mind, you can create an infinite number of decoy wallets by providing different passphrases.

8/8 Last, but not least, we have the warrant canary at https://trezor.io/transparency/canary.txt