What explains nuclear non-use in South Asia? This panel comprising @NinaTannenwald ( the one who has academically dealt with and introduced the concept in her magnum opus), @manpreetsethi01, and Sannia Abdullah, makes some interesting observations. https://www.stimson.org/event/23-years-of-nonuse-evaluating-the-nuclear-taboo-in-india-and-pakistan/

. @NinaTannenwald thinks that India has been reticent to embrace nuclear weapons, has shown restraint( not really), and has a declared NFU policy. Taken together, all this points towards an adherence to the taboo.

Restraint and the sacrosanctity of NFU were both questionable, to say the least. The commitment to NFU has been questioned since the release of the 1999 DND. Even Article 2.4 of the DND leaves ambiguity when it comes to NFU.

Article 2.4 pledged that India would not be the first to "initiate a nuclear strike". @NarangVipin has variously said that, in the DND, India committed to not starting a "process " of a nuclear strike.

According to a CCS-released official statement in 2003, "in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons."

The NFU was practically done away with.

Rightly so, Dr. @NinaTannenwald alludes to some of the factors that are eroding India's deference to the taboo, to include the risk-acceptant and jingoism behavior of the Indian leadership and nuclear-loose talk.

Dr. @NinaTannenwald 's point about nuclear nationalism is off the mark, for the country has not given/manufactured any other justification to develop nuclear weapons than the existential threat from India. It is not a symbol of national prestige.

We have an NCA headed by the Prime Minister. The lack of civilian oversight of the military, again, is not as simplistic an assessment to make.

Dr. @NinaTannenwald ,you correctly note that Pakistani leaders have pointed to the catastrophic consequences of nuclear use. Here, it is important for me to add that this was something that dictated @ImranKhanPTI 's decision-making during the Pulwama-Balakot crisis.

. @manpreetsethi01 , officials at the highest levels cannot be expected to make "casual statements" on all things nuclear, especially when their counterparts do not believe in India's commitment to upholding its NFU policy. Apropos of RS' statement, the "future" could start 2mrow.

Also, RS made that statement on August 16, much after the election, not to mention that his remarks were made in Pokhran.

Indeed, the compulsions of nuclear strategy do not mean a repudiation of a non-use norm, @manpreetsethi01. That said, you sound if our leadership is full of gun-toting (nuclear brandishing folks). Advising caution is not akin to brandishing nukes.

Bingo. Strengthening the taboo is a win-win for all.