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We examined how #China might employ #irregularwarfare activities during a large-scale conventional fight. Here& #39;s what we found: 1/x
@WarInstitute @IrregWarfare @CNA_org https://mwi.usma.edu/chinas-irregular-approach-to-war-the-myth-of-a-purely-conventional-future-fight/">https://mwi.usma.edu/chinas-ir...
@WarInstitute @IrregWarfare @CNA_org https://mwi.usma.edu/chinas-irregular-approach-to-war-the-myth-of-a-purely-conventional-future-fight/">https://mwi.usma.edu/chinas-ir...
Great Power Competition= irregular warfare + conventional warfare
Chinese forces will likely employ a modern and unique irregular warfare concept, focused on information and influence, tightly integrated with conventional capabilities.
2/x
Chinese forces will likely employ a modern and unique irregular warfare concept, focused on information and influence, tightly integrated with conventional capabilities.
2/x
Based on our reading of Chinese military writing and historical employment of irregular warfare by great powers, we expect Chinese forces to employ IW in the following ways:
3/x
3/x
1) the coordinated use of public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare methods (aka the "three warfares").
Legal warfare to provide the basis for launching an attack, #publicopinion warfare to delegitimize the adversary, #psyops to demoralize the adversary. 4/x
Legal warfare to provide the basis for launching an attack, #publicopinion warfare to delegitimize the adversary, #psyops to demoralize the adversary. 4/x
1 cont) In a conflict we would expect Chinese forces to ramp up these efforts, especially against nations hosting US forces. Perhaps promoting narratives of US forces abusing a local population. 5/x
2) Special operations forces: China has a SOF that specializes in direct action & recon SOF - not unconventional warfare. In a conflict, we would expect PLA SOF recon and raids against key C2 and logistics nodes.
6/x
6/x
3) paramilitary forces: the China maritime militia, people& #39;s armed police (PAP), and private security companies will all play a role during war time. In a fight, the PAP would likely focus on internal security. If they went beyond China& #39;s borders it would be for CT or COIN. 7/x
3 cont) Private security companies are growing as Chinese companies expand global. For now, we don& #39;t see the PRC trusting them to carry out govt policy abroad, but this is a space to watch. 8/x
3 cont) Maritime Militia: We expect the CMM would closely integrate w/ conventional forces in war. Missions could include ISR, c-ISR, sabotage, antiaircraft missions, raiding, & EW. The more sophisticated missions (EW) would likely be conducted by full-time militia members. 9/x
What are the implications for the US #military?
1) Adopting warfighting concepts that emphasize distributed operations, might not reduce risk, but rather shift the risk from conventional to irregular threats. 10/x
1) Adopting warfighting concepts that emphasize distributed operations, might not reduce risk, but rather shift the risk from conventional to irregular threats. 10/x
2) China& #39;s embrace of gray zone activities provides US forces with many opportunities to watch and learn as they prepare to counter irregular operations in a conventional war. 11/x
3) China is employing irregular warfare activities to influence local populations (incl. US partners & potential partners) in ways that could easily be shifted to break those relationships in wartime. 12/12
