Indeed on same day, reports surfaced that Zarif wrote Khamenei in March to request that harsh critics of Iran nuclear deal be contained and pressure on negotiating team be halted.

Khamenei came out in explicit support of Zarif & Co the other week, yet hardliners not deterred..
When pressed on poss culprit, senior Iranian official told @amwajmedia: “We do not know. It is under investigation.” Zarif's overall msg is that diplomacy is generally pursued when it suits aims of those associated with “military stage”—IRGC—whereas the opposite does not occur.
Zarif’s comments are not particularly controversial in themselves. Anti-Russia sentiment is prevalent in Iran. As for questioning Quds Force influence, incl Soleimani's approach in Syria, that's not quite the “red line” often assumed either. So why the ruckus? And who gains?
Tensions between the Rouhani administration and the conservative camp are boiling over, especially given two separate and yet interwoven developments: Iran’s delicate indirect talks with the US to revive the JCPOA, and the country’s upcoming presidential elections in June.
Internal divisions are spilling out into the open the more the diplomatic talks to revive the JCPOA advance, and the closer Iran gets to holding its next presidential elections. Remarkably, hardliners seem to be ignoring Khamenei’s explicit support for Iran’s nuclear negotiators.
Reactions to #ZarifTape suggest a variety of scenarios possibly being at play. There are two obvious one:

1) Are Zarif’s opponents out to discredit his effort to negotiate a US re-entry to the nuclear deal while burying any presidential ambitions on his part?
And/or do some of Zarif's supporters want to mobilize a tired electorate with straight talk from a man who, despite drop in favorability as economy has faltered, remains among few hopes for Reformists? Framing of some of Zarif's remarks may expose him to harsher criticism ahead..
But those criticisms are unlikely to end his career. Meanwhile, criticism of Russia and IRGC tends to be praised by wide swathes of public.

Importantly, Zarif has in the past resorted to emphasizing lack of own influence to gain more influece. Case in point: his 2019 resignation
I.e. while Zarif criticizes power of Quds Force incl elements of its approach to region, reality is that Soleimani failed in alleged quest to destroy JCPOA alongside other aims. Clearly, Quds Force is not all-powerful.

Conclusion: Leak benefits Candidate Zarif, less so FM Zarif.
Lastly, Zarif is today in #Iraq for talks with senior officials including President Salih. This follows a trip to Qatar on Sunday, where he met with the Emir and also the FM.

No apparent changes to schedule or workload.
You can follow @mashabani.
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