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A propos not much, let's talk a bit about why trust matters so much to the EU in its relations with the UK
tl;dr without it, it's very hard to do anything
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tl;dr without it, it's very hard to do anything
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I've talked a lot about trust over the past years of Brexit, mainly because it's a central part of all negotiating: it's the grease in the system that makes things run much more smoothly
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How to build trust is pretty simple, as I've sketched out below.
Actually doing it? more tricky
https://twitter.com/Usherwood/status/1234397947711934464?s=20
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Actually doing it? more tricky
https://twitter.com/Usherwood/status/1234397947711934464?s=20
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So far, so generic
But trust matters in lots of aspects of negotiating beyond the general attitudinal approach
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But trust matters in lots of aspects of negotiating beyond the general attitudinal approach
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The core principle of pacta sunt servanda relies on a degree of trust that if you've freely entered into a commitment, you stick to it
https://twitter.com/Usherwood/status/1306888617542004737?s=20
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https://twitter.com/Usherwood/status/1306888617542004737?s=20
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Part of that is accepting that while there might be problems down the line, you have a process for dealing with that
Whether in the WA...
https://twitter.com/Usherwood/status/1305416334814085120?s=20
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Whether in the WA...
https://twitter.com/Usherwood/status/1305416334814085120?s=20
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...or the specific mechanism for the Northern Ireland Protocol (art.16)
https://twitter.com/Usherwood/status/1357596052606615555?s=20
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https://twitter.com/Usherwood/status/1357596052606615555?s=20
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In short, parties have to feel confident that the other party will keep its word and act in good faith when there's an issue
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That's why the IMB proposals last September caused so much concern for the EU: the UK was not only acting explicitly against the operation of pacta sunt servanda for the WA, but also raising doubts about why it might later do with the then negotiations for the TCA
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Even at the time, it was clear this was a move that would have numerous strongly negative effects for the UK, especially in its dealings with the EU
https://twitter.com/Usherwood/status/1302868728854589441?s=20
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https://twitter.com/Usherwood/status/1302868728854589441?s=20
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It was just possible that a rapid u-turn on IMB might have contained the impacts, but that issue dragged on through the rest of 2020, and since has been joined by various other instances, including:
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The various invocations of Art.16 as an option, the unilateral extension of grace periods, and more general rhetoric about not having to follow commitments
https://twitter.com/Usherwood/status/1370064429866479630?s=20
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https://twitter.com/Usherwood/status/1370064429866479630?s=20
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Also keep in mind that EU sees a UK willing to challenge even the niceties of interaction, as with the EU's ambassador's status (still not resolved BTW)
https://twitter.com/Usherwood/status/1352171584203730949?s=20
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https://twitter.com/Usherwood/status/1352171584203730949?s=20
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But we drift a bit from the original Q of why all this matters to much to the EU
Largely because negotiation (and its attendant principles) is what the EU is
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Largely because negotiation (and its attendant principles) is what the EU is
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EU rests on a system of very dense interaction between members; interactions that help to foster trust, which in turn allows for more constructive outputs
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If you'd like a bit of theory, this is Karl Deutsch's communication theory: closer ties generates a community
(and yes, there are critiques of that, but let's run with it)
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(and yes, there are critiques of that, but let's run with it)
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To flip that around, accepting challenges to a core part of the negotiation model would mean a challenge to the operation of the EU itself: if member states could just do as they wished, then the system would lose meaning
[insert HUN/POL RoL punchline here]
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[insert HUN/POL RoL punchline here]
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There are sanctions that could be applied, but they rely on a general willingness to apply them. Look at the Excessive Deficit Procedure for an example of what happens when that's not there
And that's for member states, where the options are much greater than for 3rd states
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And that's for member states, where the options are much greater than for 3rd states
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So poor trust in the UK (mirrored by UK's poor trust in EU) makes it hard to enter into any constructive process: the cost-benefit is tipped much more to the former
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One upshot of this is that this isn't a gambit by EU to draw concessions from UK
Instead, it's a need for sustained, broad-based demonstration of trustworthiness
That means sticking to commitments and working through problems constructively, w/in agreed mechanisms
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Instead, it's a need for sustained, broad-based demonstration of trustworthiness
That means sticking to commitments and working through problems constructively, w/in agreed mechanisms
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That's necessarily a slow and uncertain process, and one that UK doesn't look immediately ready to engage with (certainly politically), so expect trust to remain a key sticking point in the coming years, not least 2025 at the first full review
https://twitter.com/Usherwood/status/1353666924241166336?s=20
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https://twitter.com/Usherwood/status/1353666924241166336?s=20
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In sum: trust matters in all negotiations and especially in EU-UK relations, even before we get to any substance
/end
/end
