Read on Twitter
The debate contained within these tweets is a critical one: the question of to what extent the #Taliban will try to seize Kabul by force—as opposed to using force in support of a political track—is one I see many people grappling with here. 1/n https://twitter.com/bsarwary/status/1386140498788765698
My view is that the #Taliban will press the mil front in 2022 but in a calibrated way—ie, they won’t “empty the madrassas” in a Tet style offensive, but will likely cont surrounding & pressuring provincial capitals. If the opportunity presents to seize 1/more, they’ll take it 2/n
But they know they can’t win militarily so long as the AAF/Commandos are in tact & the #ANDSF doesn’t fracture—neither of which are likely to happen so long as US security assistance $$ continues at scale. I assess it will until at least 2024. 3/n
I say that b/c @JoeBiden made the decision to leave early in his presidency & he won’t want to see #Afghanistan collapse during his term. There are also plenty of influential Congress members who support staying engaged in AFG for CT & human rights reasons. 4/n
The Moscow “Troika Plus” statement also made clear that no regional state wants to see a massive civil war or even outright #Taliban victory—not even #Pakistan wants those things. The int’l community is aligned on the necessity of a pol solution—of course, they vary on terms. 5/n
Finally, the #Taliban derive too much legitimacy & recognition from the Doha process & US- #Taliban agreement to abandon that path to push wholesale for mil victory or to risk int’l community isolation that would come from massive increases in violence. 6/n
All of which is to say, I expect 2022 to be more violent than this year, but not massively so. I believe the #Taliban will continue their “strangle the cities to generate leverage & extract concessions” approach that has frankly been working well for them so far. 7/n
