A US Dep. of Defense report mentions US forces intercepted Iranian weapons shipments bound for Taliban forces at least 6 years before the death of Muhammad Umar (rahimullah). British military also found Taliban using Iranian made rockets around this time.

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The "Taliban 2.0" narrative suggests that they changed somehow after the death of Muhammed Umar. There's a lot of holes in this narrative.

The fact is, large movements always encompass a range of ideological stances.

They have to in order to become large.

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The idea that IS is now carrying on the "true" legacy of jihad which AQ and Taliban abandoned is completely untrue.

Clearly distinct currents of thought were established around the end of the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan.

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The ideological predecessors of IS established themselves in the area around Jalalabad. Even then they refused to fight alongside the Taliban, rejecting their traditional Hanafi orientation.

Interestingly, the Jalalabad area is still where IS is strongest in Khorasan.

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Students in the camps around Jalalabad made takfir of the Taliban years before the US invasion.

One of their leaders, Abu Abdullah al Muhajir, was also highly critical of bin Laden for working with the Taliban and the Sudanese (Ikhwani) regime.

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Abu Abdullah al Muhajir later went on to write "The Fiqh of Bloods" which was one of the main influences in shaping IS's strategy in Iraq.

He later became part of al Qaeda, but this is not because he accepted bin Laden's manhaj.

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Rather, bin Laden accepted him more due the same pragmatism which made him willing to work with the Taliban despite having strong disagreements with them.

It was presumably hoped that the mujahidin could be united even while holding different opinions.

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A large number of those who beloged to the camps around Jalalabad were Algerians, and they eventually became the dominant force in the GIA in Algerian civil war.

Later the GIA began attacking other Muslim groups that were fighting the French-backed government in Algeria.

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Eventually this resulted in a total collapse of the jihad in Algeria as the GIA made general takfir on Algerians and lost all popular support.

This is one reason why bin Laden had doubts when Zarqawi approached him, seeking support to found what would later become ISIS.

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It was known that Zarqawi had ideas very similar to the GIA, but he was also the best option for supporting jihad in Iraq in the face of the American invasion.

Events, it seems, have confirmed bin Laden's doubts about supporting and establishing Zarqawi.

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Still, it was a decision based on weighing harms and benefits, and the truth is that it is not possible to say if the harm of the decision has outweighed the benefit, because the effects have not run their course.

Ultimately Allah will judge on the matter.

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But the idea that al Qaeda and the Taliban somehow deviated from what they were upon, and that IS is now the rightful heir to their legacy, is either ignorance or dishonesty.

If there is to be discussion, it should be on the basis of honesty and certainty.

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