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So, here's the thing. The "mission" is "prevent the use of nuclear weapons against the United States." The problem is endless scenario planning about warfighting use, which is ludicrous but it's what planners get paid for. /1 https://twitter.com/nukestrat/status/1384983688132374529
That's not to say planning and wargaming is a bad idea, because the President needs more options than "screw it, incinerate the planet." But the idea that "I need X warheads for the mission" is pretty much 1960 thinking. This is a throwback to "destroy X Soviet ability." /2
At every stage of nuclear reductions, someone said "Okay, but any lower and we're in mortal peril." Lower than 20,000? Peril. 6000? Peril limit. 2200? Threshold of Hell. This is baked into U.S. nuclear planning and never changes. /3
I want to read this testimony, and maybe I don't get what ADM Richard meant, but historically, the U.S. military thinks deterrence means "a package of options and abilities," which is wrong. I mean, it's just flat wrong. /4
Deterrence is a *psychological* condition created by capabilities and by political will. Does anyone thing we're *not* deterred by China or Russia because China only has hundreds of weapons, and Russia's deterrent is, in many areas, outdated? Of course not. /5
What we don't want to say is that the "counterforce," warfighting mode is nonsense, and always was. We don't want to say that we have more than enough to cripple two of our adversaries at the same time. We want to adhere (as do RU/PRC) to outmoded ideas of "control." /6
GWB, as much as some of you hate him, got this back in his time. But he didn't want to say that we'd just deter RU by targeting population and infrastructure, which is what we'll end up doing (as will they). But the warfighting culture is strong and persistent. /7
This is because from the 1950s onward, "warfighting" and "damage-limitation" were part of the same "strike back under attack as fast as possible" strategy. It made sense - as much as anything can in this - from 1950 to about 1970. But we can't get to a "pure deterrence" mode. /8
So, until we just declare that nukes are to deter nukes, and that the arsenal is to take an attacker down with us, you're going to get these "I need X warheads" statements. We need a Nuclear Posture Review that actually means something, but fat chance of that. /9
And if there was ever a time to remind you that I don't speak the Naval War College, the Navy, or any component of the DoD, this is it. I don't. /10x
