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So, here& #39;s the thing. The "mission" is "prevent the use of nuclear weapons against the United States." The problem is endless scenario planning about warfighting use, which is ludicrous but it& #39;s what planners get paid for. /1 https://twitter.com/nukestrat/status/1384983688132374529">https://twitter.com/nukestrat...
That& #39;s not to say planning and wargaming is a bad idea, because the President needs more options than "screw it, incinerate the planet." But the idea that "I need X warheads for the mission" is pretty much 1960 thinking. This is a throwback to "destroy X Soviet ability." /2
At every stage of nuclear reductions, someone said "Okay, but any lower and we& #39;re in mortal peril." Lower than 20,000? Peril. 6000? Peril limit. 2200? Threshold of Hell. This is baked into U.S. nuclear planning and never changes. /3
I want to read this testimony, and maybe I don& #39;t get what ADM Richard meant, but historically, the U.S. military thinks deterrence means "a package of options and abilities," which is wrong. I mean, it& #39;s just flat wrong. /4
Deterrence is a *psychological* condition created by capabilities and by political will. Does anyone thing we& #39;re *not* deterred by China or Russia because China only has hundreds of weapons, and Russia& #39;s deterrent is, in many areas, outdated? Of course not. /5
What we don& #39;t want to say is that the "counterforce," warfighting mode is nonsense, and always was. We don& #39;t want to say that we have more than enough to cripple two of our adversaries at the same time. We want to adhere (as do RU/PRC) to outmoded ideas of "control." /6
GWB, as much as some of you hate him, got this back in his time. But he didn& #39;t want to say that we& #39;d just deter RU by targeting population and infrastructure, which is what we& #39;ll end up doing (as will they). But the warfighting culture is strong and persistent. /7
This is because from the 1950s onward, "warfighting" and "damage-limitation" were part of the same "strike back under attack as fast as possible" strategy. It made sense - as much as anything can in this - from 1950 to about 1970. But we can& #39;t get to a "pure deterrence" mode. /8
So, until we just declare that nukes are to deter nukes, and that the arsenal is to take an attacker down with us, you& #39;re going to get these "I need X warheads" statements. We need a Nuclear Posture Review that actually means something, but fat chance of that. /9
