(thread) Some thoughts on verification of ASAT arms control. Going back to the '70s, alleged problems with verification have been used as argument against ASAT arms control. We have to ask, why did Ford and Carter believe that ASAT arms control was possible but Reagan did not?

2)Verification is both an intelligence and political question. Intelligence agencies can't determine whether or not a treaty can be verified until the framework is established. The political element involves the ultimate objective (e.g., securing advantage, stability, etc)

3) With ASATs, there are primary and residual capabilities. Primary are dedicated ASATs, residual are primarily missile defense systems that are ASAT capable

4) Carter wanted to limit dedicated ASAT systems and then abolish them. The IC knew where all the Soviet SS-9s used to launch the IS ASAT were located. Consequently, the IC was confident it could verify that IS had been moved into a non operational status.

5) With Reagan, ASAT arms control was a threat to SDI. Consequently, verification became a political tool to prevent ASAT arms control from moving forward.

6) With advances in sensor technologies, verification is even less challenging today for dedicated ASAT capabilities. U.S. reluctance to bring missile defense into the conversation will remain a challenge. Fundamentally, verification is not the problem. (end)