Catholic friends have been urging me to read Waldstein on the common good. So I finally did.

I won’t comment on the theology. But as political theory this essay is naive and misguided. As a basis for political conservatism, it’s a non-starter. /1 https://thejosias.com/2015/02/03/the-good-the-highest-good-and-the-common-good/

There are a several problems here. But let’s begin at the end:

Waldstein wants to found the political theory of the state on the thesis that the “primary intrinsic common good” of every legitimate state is “peace.”
(Thesis 34)

I’m sure peace is an aspect of the common good. /2

And it seems that Waldstein wants to define peace in a technical way that expands its meaning, which is fine.

But Waldstein is making the same mistake that is rightly condemned by conservatives when the come across it in liberal political theory:

/3

He is trying to reduce a very complicated domain—the common good or national interest of an independent nation—to a single principle.

For liberals, this single principle is often said to be the freedom of the individual. (Or freedom and equality). /4

But this reduction has always been a terrible idea. When you try to reduce the political common good or national interest to just individual liberty—or to claim that all other principles flow from it—you blind yourself to the other factors operative in the domain. /5

A great example is the way that so liberals are blinded to the dangers of free trade with a hostile power like China—because they believe private individuals should be free to trade with anyone they want. /6

Or the way liberals are blinded to the need to regulate tech monopolies because they think that would violate individual liberty.

/7

The lesson conservatives should have learned from this liberal dogmatism is that the common good of the nation can’t be reduced to one highly abstract principle.

If you try, you do unlimited damage to your ability to govern in a way that reflects actual national interests. /8

I’m not excited about watching conservatives going down this rabbit hole of rationalist dogmatism just like the liberals did.

It doesn’t matter if you call your one “primary common good” peace or order, or anything else. You will recreate the same kind of political blindness. /9

A related point is that, like liberalism and Marxism, Waldstein’s theory presumes to say what’s right for every nation on earth, and for a world government too.

Things like tradition, experience, and particular national or religious identity have no place in the theory.

/10

For example, this theory says nothing at all about whether the American or British constitutions have anything about them that might be special and worth preserving.

It deals only with extremely abstract ideas, without touching empirical political reality. /11

I don’t mean any disrespect. But I have to ask:

Aren’t you concerned that a universal doctrine this abstract—this disconnected from actual national traditions and empirical reality—is exactly the kind of ticket that Enlightenment liberalism and Marxism ran on?

/12

Let me repeat something I think you all know. Words like “peace” and “order” can be interpreted to mean anything.

As with “freedom,” the only thing that makes them safe and sane to handle is the particular national constitution and traditions that tame and channel their use. /13

I don’t mind your asking me to read a political theory of this kind. 

But I’d like to know how Waldstein’s theory fits together with the actual national traditions on the ground in some of the countries in which this theory is supposed to be applied.  /14

That’s it for now. /end

Fr. Waldstein @sancrucensis has posted a kind reply to my criticism, which I appreciate. I will offer a few comments in return.

In short: Even with his clarifications, Waldstein still hasn't offered us a plausible political theory of the common good. /1 https://twitter.com/sancrucensis/status/1383850689625870336?s=20

Let's begin with why this conversation is important.

In recent years, all sorts of public figures and intellectuals have called into question the use of terms such as "common good," "national interest," "public interest," and others.

/2

The claim comes from liberals who say that "common good" and similar terms are hopelessly broad and vague, and that they can in fact be used to justify anything.

Instead, we are told that what really matters is the good of the individual, and we should stick with that.

/3

But in order to advance a conservative alternative to liberalism and an ascendant new Marxism, we have to be able to think clearly and speak intelligently about the good or the interests of a family, congregation, or nation.

/4

Thinking about what's good for human groups such as a family, tribe, or nation is fundamental to the political thought of the Bible, and to nearly all Jewish and Christian political thought since then.

So we need to have a clear view of what this is about.

/5

My objection to Fr. Waldstein's paper is that in defining the "common good" of the nation as "peace," he is replacing one extremely abstract term by another.

"Peace," taken by itself, can in fact be used to justify anything and everything. /6

In his reply to me, Waldstein, reformulates his position so that it is indeed clearer than it was in his paper: In his new formulation, the political common good "consists in relations (peace) and in virtuous actions (happiness)."

/7

But this is still wildly abstract and vague.

It is like a new Marxist saying that the good "consists in relations (equity) and in virtuous actions (justice)."

Or a liberal saying that the good "consists in relations (equality) and in virtuous actions (liberty)."

/8

I suppose there is some truth in each of these statements. But they are so broad as to tell us almost nothing about what a statesman should actually do.

As Aristotle once said in a related context: "If a man had only this knowledge, he would be none the wiser."

/9

What would a more useful discussion of the common good look like?

In my view we might want to consult those who have some experience in statecraft and ask them: What are the ends towards which political activity (by those who are skilled and righteous) actually strives? /10

I will offer two examples. First, there is a text drafted by the American conservative statesman Gouverneur Morris. This text (which was included in the Constitution of 1787) describes the seven ends for which the American national government was erected: /11

"[i] to form a more perfect union, [ii] establish justice, [iii] insure domestic tranquility, [iv] provide for the common defence, [v] promote the general welfare, and [vi] secure the blessings of liberty [vii] to ourselves and our posterity."

/12

Here is a 2nd text. This one is from Edmund Burke, the great Anglo-Irish statesman and philosopher, in his Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs (1791). Burke is describing the British constitution, which he also regards as having seven ends: /13

"to unite [i-ii] private and public liberty with [iii] public force, [iv] with order, [v] with peace, [vi] with justice, and above all, [vii] with the institutions formed for bestowing permanence and stability through the ages."

/14

I doubt that Morris and Burke intended these lists to be comprehensive.

Yet both understood that the political domain is complex, and that any attempt to adequately describe the ends of a good national government will name a number of distinct and conflicting purposes.

/15

Consider, for example, the fiasco of U.S. businessmen offshoring their manufacturing capabilities to China over the last two decades.

Most of these businessmen, and the politicians who helped them, thought they were pursuing Waldstein's ends of "peace" and "happiness." /16

But Morris and Burke would have known these gentlemen were acting like fools. They would have said American leaders were missing the first aim and end of the US Constitution: To form a more perfect union--that is, to form the diverse parts of America into one nation.

/17

Today, we see the consequences of not worrying too much about the aim of national cohesion or union: The Americans have brought upon themselves the worst sectoral divisions since their Civil War.

/18

Besides national cohesion, Morris and Burke would have mentioned other ends that militated against a policy of "free trade with China," including: Justice, "the common defense," "the general welfare," "public liberty" (aka national independence), "permanence and stability." /19

I believe Morris and Burke were on the right track. It seems there are perhaps eight or ten conflicting ends that the skilled and righteous statesman is forever balancing and re-balancing against one another to determine the best course for his nation. /20

I don't think the ends I've mentioned here make a complete list, and I suspect there never will be a complete list.

But we've seen enough to know that any two abstract principles such as "peace" and "happiness" cannot do the work. Taken alone, they can only do harm. /21

Fr. Waldstein has said that what is wrong with modern politics is that it is indifferent to ends. In a way, this is true. Liberalism and Marxism are indifferent to *many* of the ends of good government.

/22

They fixate on one or two legitimate ends of government (such as liberty or justice), and are indifferent to the other ends that place *limits* on their fixed idea.

/23

I do agree with Fr. Waldstein about the importance of teaching virtue. And I agree that politicians inevitably influence the public--if not toward what is right then toward what is wrong. So we do need virtuous political leadership to assist in shaping a virtuous citizenry. /24

But while the virtues of public figures and private individuals are certainly crucial in attaining the common good, I fear that Fr. Waldstein is putting too much weight on Aristotle's distinction between art (making) and prudence (doing). /25

The distinction between making and doing is useful for some things, but it is too sharply drawn when applied to politics, religion, and morals. Although the virtuous deed is worthy in itself, it is also an act of making. /26

This is the reason that a connection is possible between the virtuous acts of citizens and the attainment of the national interest or common good. The virtuous act is artful in that it contributes to the making of a good family, a good community, and a good nation. /27

But the balance among the proper ends of government change with the circumstances facing the nation. This means that while an abstract description of virtue may remain static, the real-world political ends toward which virtuous action must be directed change. /28

Many deeds are "good in themselves." Charity is always good. But there is an art to the virtuous deed, which throws the deed into the balance precisely where it is needed most. Here, the deed is both making and doing, art and prudence. /29

This unity of art and prudence, however, is only possible where one has understood the needed balance among political ends that are vying against one another at a given moment. /30

This means that if we wish to be truly virtuous, we cannot be satisfied with an overly simplistic understanding of the ends that constitute the common good. We cannot say that it is always about "peace" or "happiness" or "liberty." Because it isn't. /31

Such a simplistic political theory will push vicious persons to unimagined heights of depravity.

But it will also steal from virtuous persons the possibility of directing their deeds to what is most needed, at that fateful hour when they are called upon to act.

/ 32

/end for now.