This idea, oft-repeated by US analysts, that the 'vast majority' of countries side with the US on the issue of military activities in the EEZ is not based in evidence.

The uncomfortable reality (for the US) is most countries have not stated their position on the issue.

1/13 https://twitter.com/Cold_Peace_/status/1380517167624507392

Of those with explicit stances on foreign military exercises, it's about even on each side: a dozen or so maritime powers vs. 18 states opposed.
(Numbers in my dissertation dataset, based on US Navy Maritime Claims Reference Manual; Roach & Smith's Excessive Maritime Claims.) 2/

Notably, that 18 doesn't even include China or other countries that treat military surveys as marine scientific research but don't ban exercises.

(Incidentally this highlights that India's position on military activities in the EEZ is actually more restrictive than China's. 3/13

India requires consent for military exercises & surveys in the EEZ; China only for surveys, and its stance on that has softened over time.

E.g. Compare their declarations upon ratifying UNCLOS--no mention of this in China's, yes in India's: https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en ) 4/13

(I will be releasing a paper this summer based on my dissertation that explains and traces China's position on this issue and the evolution therein over time. And my full dissertation should be up on ProQuest/DSpace@MIT soon.) 5/13

It is both a logical and an empirical fallacy to assume that the vast majority of states who haven't stated an explicit position favor the US view on military activities in the EEZ.

(It doesn't mean that they oppose the US either, of course. It's often more complicated.) 6/13

US analysts arrive at the 'vast majority' notion by way of deduction: in their view, UNCLOS does not permit these restrictions; ergo, if countries ratify UNCLOS & do not explicitly impose restrictions, then they agree with the US that these restrictions are not permitted. 7/13

But that view of UNCLOS it itself contested. As I explain in greater detail in this thread, UNCLOS is ambiguous on the issue of foreign military activities in the EEZ as a direct consequence of the unresolved tensions around this issue at UNCLOS III: https://twitter.com/resplinodell/status/1380923308355555339 8/13

Empirically, Japan, one of the case studies for my dissertation, is a fascinating illustrative case of why it's incorrect to make the 'vast majority' claim.

As I confirmed in interviews with Japanese govt officials & advisers, Japan has adopted a deliberate non-position... 9/13

on the permissibility of foreign military activities in the EEZ under international law, instead treating such activities on a case-by-case basis and keeping its options open to adopt a more restrictive position in the future (given increasing PLA operations in their EEZ). 10/13

Bottom line: Military activities at sea remain a very contentious issue in international politics, for understandable reasons.

As a result, the law of the sea is ambiguous on this point, as is often true with intl law on areas relevant to core security concerns of states. 11/13

For weaker states, foreign military activities near their coasts are a potential source of danger and thus a cause of insecurity.

For naval powers, freedom to operate mostly unfettered in the world's oceans is viewed as of paramount importance for strategic interests. 12/13

To build its soft power in an age of shifting power, the US should be more flexible & open to compromise on these issues.

At a minimum, portraying this issue as more settled than it is just makes other countries feel like the US is oblivious to their security concerns. 13/13