I basically agree with this back-and-forth about why Israel would want to prevent a diplomatic solution to Iran& #39;s nuclear program even though the sabotage campaign cannot reasonably be expected to prevent Iran from ultimately building nuclear weapons if it chooses. https://twitter.com/PatPorter76/status/1381576583966814208">https://twitter.com/PatPorter...

As one colleague admitted pre-JCPOA: He was against a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem because fear of Iran& #39;s nuclear weapons program was the most effective issue around which to organize a campaign to isolate the Islamic Republic.

He wanted sanctions because he loathed the regime and wanted it removed. He was frank about his goal and clear-eyed about his strategy: Other countries would not support sanctions for Iran& #39;s other malign behaviors, only for the nuclear issue. So, you go with your best argument.

This is also, FYI, why the Bush Administration in 2002-2003 emphasized Saddam& #39;s non-existent nuclear weapons program. It was, as Paul Wolfowitz admitted, not his motive, just the argument that could command internal consensus:
https://web.archive.org/web/20061002073443/http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2594">https://web.archive.org/web/20061...

And so, as I say in the @irandealpodcast: the problem isn& #39;t that the JCPOA didn& #39;t work; it& #39;s that it *did*. Much more so than assassinations, sabotage or sanctions ever could.