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I basically agree with this back-and-forth about why Israel would want to prevent a diplomatic solution to Iran's nuclear program even though the sabotage campaign cannot reasonably be expected to prevent Iran from ultimately building nuclear weapons if it chooses. https://twitter.com/PatPorter76/status/1381576583966814208
As one colleague admitted pre-JCPOA: He was against a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem because fear of Iran's nuclear weapons program was the most effective issue around which to organize a campaign to isolate the Islamic Republic.
He wanted sanctions because he loathed the regime and wanted it removed. He was frank about his goal and clear-eyed about his strategy: Other countries would not support sanctions for Iran's other malign behaviors, only for the nuclear issue. So, you go with your best argument.
This is also, FYI, why the Bush Administration in 2002-2003 emphasized Saddam's non-existent nuclear weapons program. It was, as Paul Wolfowitz admitted, not his motive, just the argument that could command internal consensus:
https://web.archive.org/web/20061002073443/http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2594
https://web.archive.org/web/20061002073443/http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2594
And so, as I say in the @irandealpodcast: the problem isn't that the JCPOA didn't work; it's that it *did*. Much more so than assassinations, sabotage or sanctions ever could.
