Having written it I wanted to emphasise a few points:
1. The Army's strategy is a work in progress. It will only become clear when Project Embankment publishes its recommendations in July / August. I hope so, because, as things stand, the lack of vision and coherence is scary.
2. Whatever the future force structure, the Army needs massive recapitalisation beyond the billions already allocated. This is a tough sell given likely Covid-19 austerity and a litany of troubled acquisition programmes.
3. Modernisation has been deferred for 20 years. Like a thatched roof with holes in it, if you do nothing, more holes will appear. Eventually you reach a point where you have to repair the whole roof. Repairing it on an ongoing basis is always less costly than a complete new one.
4. Personnel cuts simply make a bad situation worse. You cannot have critical mass without adequate Human Resources. Given the range of commitments outlined, the Navy needs another 5,000 sailors. The Army needs 90,000 soldiers not 72,500.
5. People forget that the training and life skills that the Armed Forces give upcoming generations is an incredible means of social mobility. In many instances, it prevents those who come from disadvantaged backgrounds or who lack education from turning to life of crime.
6. The world is more dangerous and volatile than it has been at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis. We face multiple threats, not a singular one. Now is a time to reinforce defence, not cut back.
7. Contemporary conflicts unfold with unexpected speed and ferocity. This means we go to war with the forces we have, not those we would ideally like. A lack of preparedness in 1939, required 5 years before we were ready to take on nazi Germany on equal terms.
8. We are investing in light forces when the threats we face represent a resurgence in peer adversary's capabilities. Of course, our armed forces need to be more usable by being more deployable, but we still need high end capabilities.
9. We want to invest in high tech weaponry so that we can punch above our weight. This is right. But technology is not a substitute for hard power. Many emerging technologies are not mature in their military applications. Using them creates serious operational risks.
10. Ultimately, we are in the midst of a revolution in military affairs that is likely to be as transformational as Blitzkrieg was in 1939. We need to start thinking about how we will fight the next war. We won't get it 100% right first time, but doing nothing is not an option.
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