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While the optionality gained by not ratifying the UNCLOS lends the US substantive maneuverability in any effort to exert global maritime dominance, the recent events appear far less “provocative” than what we see vis-à-vis traditional allies like Japan and South Korea.
Thread: https://twitter.com/manupubby/status/1380395123276611585
Thread: https://twitter.com/manupubby/status/1380395123276611585
The Japanese and South Koreans have seen US warships just 12 nautical miles from their coast (as opposed to India’s 130 miles). Unbounded by UNCLOS, and with a formidable naval fleet, they will continue to dominate the seas and project power even against regional allies.
The main sticking point is the publicity the US has given to its actions. As I have mentioned before, the US’ inclusion in the Quad is as much about FONOP in their favor and securing their geostrategic interests as it is about unilateral power projection in the Indo-Pacific.
There’s also a bigger natural resource play in the works. As the US decarbonizes, its demand for lithium and rare earths will grow exponentially. Currently, China dominates in the upstream and refining sectors. Seabed mining provides an efficient alternative to land-based mining.
India too is in the race for securing lithium. Its maritime claims under UNCLOS give it access to 70,000 sq km in the IOR. For the US, displaying military prowess in mineral rich seas is perhaps a 21st century version of what it did in oil rich lands. https://www.indiaglobalbusiness.com/analyses/in-focus/ocean-mining-indias-next-frontier
Despite claiming that having not ratified the UNCLOS does not prevent it from engaging in seabed mining, the US struggles to get around the legal challenges. Defense firms like Lockheed have had to set up foreign subsidiaries to access mineral rich regions afar.
The incursion near Lakshadweep, which is mere 450 miles from Maldives, may also be worthy of being viewed in context of the US-Maldives defense partnership (which New Delhi endorsed). There’s a global superpower with a military footprint in India’s immediate maritime space.
But as mentioned by @d_jaishankar here, India’s and China’s respective visions for the Indo-Pacific differ vastly, and this plays into the US foreign policy matrix when they conduct FONOPs. https://twitter.com/d_jaishankar/status/1380402196932661249
My response to the Brookings paper on the Asian order (expand for full thread): https://twitter.com/suryakane/status/1349842783549464578?s=21 https://twitter.com/suryakane/status/1349842783549464578
