(1/12) #OTD in 2017, an air strike hit the town of #KhanShaykhun in #Syria, releasing large amounts of the nerve agent #sarin. It killed dozens of people, including children, and injured hundreds. Today, we remember the victims of this #warcrime.

(2/12) The OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism concluded with confidence that the sarin identified in samples taken from Khan Shaykhun had most likely been made with a precursor from the original Syrian stockpile. https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N17/349/30/pdf/N1734930.pdf?OpenElement

(3/12) On April 8 2020, the #OPCW Investigation & Identification Team released its report into 3 #chemicalweapons attacks in #Ltamenah on March 24, 25 & 30, 2017. It concluded with confidence that individuals from the Syrian Air Force perpetrated them. https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2020/04/s-1867-2020%28e%29.pdf

(4/12) Investigators determined that the sarin used in March 2017 in Ltamenah was produced with the same precursors and raw materials as those in the Syrian stockpile.

(5/12) The IIT also determined that the chemical fingerprint of the sarin used in Ltamenah shows significant similarities to the sarin used in Khan Shaykhun. This suggests it was produced the exact same way.

(6/12) Only the Syrian regime is known to have developed and manufactured the type of sarin used in Ltamenah and Khan Shaykhun. The evidence is iron-clad and not scientifically disputable.

(7/12) In addition to Ltamenah and Khan Shaykhun, the Syrian regime also perpetrated three more CW attacks between 2014 and 2015. More incidents are currently under investigation.

(8/12) These attacks occurred after Syria’s *declared* stockpiles were destroyed under international verification. But Syria’s declaration to the @OPCW has been incomplete & inaccurate since it was first made.

(9/12) Syria has made 17 amendments to its declaration after the OPCW’s work exposed its attempts to hide CWs and capabilities.

(10/12) The OPCW Executive Council asked Syria in 2020 to complete its declaration, but Syria has refused to do so.

(11/12) The nature of these outstanding issues undermines the Chemical Weapon Convention. Every State Party has an international legal obligation to destroy its CWs. Syria still possesses CWs and the capabilities to deploy them.

(12/12) We must act. At the upcoming 25th session of the Conference of the States Parties #CSP25 (20-21 April), we must collectively send Syria a message that the world will not stand by and tolerate the use of CWs. Syria must dismantle the remainder of its CW programme.