Let's also look at how horribly the UPA botched up resulting in 26/11 & the response.

1) 27 alerts on an attack on Mumbai was passed from the CIA to RAW. All of it ignored.

3) the Jihadis tried to enter Mumbai twice and both failed. Yet there was no response from the govt3 https://twitter.com/SudsG4/status/1331812806824321025
2/n 3) As soon as the jihadis landed, alert fishermen warned the cops of suspicious activity. The police ignored the warnings.

As bad as these were, now comes the truly criminal part.

4) it took the state & centre 3 hours after the attacks began to declare it a terror strike
3/n they rubbished these massive attacks as "underworld gang war". The reason must be very obvious, a Jihadi strike went against the UPA narrative of "no Jihadi terror only Saffron terror". It took this inept govt 3 hours to even request for the NSG

5) despite massive corruption
4/n scandals including Augusta, this inept govt had not increased one bit NSG bases. Therefore the nearest unit was in Haryana. A mere 1.5 hrs by flight. Yet this useless govt refused to provide IAF planes. The RAW then had to commandeer a IAF plane in Palam.
5/n 6) as the GoI refused to mobilise IAF assets, this one Il76 transport plane used acted as a constraint in itself. It could only transport 110 troopers, to move the full complement of 300+ this needed to make 3 trips.

It took a whopping 8 hours to land the full complement
6/n the first unit itself reached only 4 hours later.

Let's summarise. The first attacks began at 2000 hrs, the GoI declared it a Terror strike only by 0000 hrs on 27/11, the first NSG complement reached Mumbai (more on this later) only by 0300.

For 7 hours there was no
7/n central or trained response. Only the brave but underarmed Mumbai cops had to deal with these heavily armed and trained Jihadis.

7) the plane waited on the tarmac for one full hour as Shivraj Patil the then HM wanted to (publicity stunt?) Arrive with the NSG troop
8/n and hence 100 of the elitest units in India sat by twiddling their thumbs.

8) on the ground in Mumbai the situation was worse. The first troop landed by 0300 yes but they were then taken by road from the airport to the Mantralaya for a briefing by the state HM
9/n not choppers, not fast moving SUV's but ancient BEST buses.

Briefing for the later arrivals done, the NSg finally got into action 12 hours later. 13 hours after the attacks began

Let me repeat, one of the worst Jihadi attacks on Indian soil and this UPA govt took
10/n 13 hours to get the most elite units into action.

9) utter break down in communications - in these terror and war like (using the recent Indo China standoff here as an ex) scenarios, communication is standardised. Not the UPA though.

I remember watching briefings from
11/n the NSG head, a bunch of different local unit army commanders, the Deputy chief of police Bombay, then the HM gave an announcement, but the state CM and HM refused to say a single word.

10) utter failure in state unit and central (NSG + Marco) interoperability.
12/n the state run ATS intercepted clear instructions from the Paki handlers to the Jihadis. Yet none of this was passed to the Marcos or NSG who went in blind.

13) live telecast - this was galling to me even as a passive witness watching TV. The vultures like Barkha got in
13/n and provided video inputs on the areas where the NSG and Marcos were breaching, where there was firing. They showed the commando units forming up, predicting when an attack would go in etc. All this picked up by the Handlers in Jihadistan & passed back to the jihadis
15/15 #neverforgetneverforgive Jihadi attacks happen. We as citizens understand it but this level of callous, criminally poor response?

The home minister Patil was busy changing his clothes before every briefing.
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