I don’t tweet enough about the Vietnam War. To remedy that, I’ll explain where I think I fit in the historiography.

Historiography of the Vietnam War is complex, though often distilled into two groups: Orthodox and Revisionist. The former basically argue the war was unnwinnable.

The latter argue that the U.S. either had the war won at a certain date or that the U.S. could have won. Yes, I’m oversimplifying, but I don’t want to get too far into the finer points. I see myself as being part of the Orthodox school but Post-Revisionist might be more accurate.

I don’t see the U.S. as ever having a solid chance of winning. Hell, I do so far as arguing we lost the 1968 Tet Offensive in that it wrecked pacification (read my book when it comes out). However, I think the Republic of Vietnam had every right to exist (a Revisionist point).

I think to best understand the war one must place in the context of the Cold War (which might be a point held in both schools, I forget right now). I don’t see Ngô Đình Diệm as being the only choice at the time for the RVN because the political scene in Saigon alone was complex.

Revisionists argue that he was the best leader and that his assassination harmed to the RVN. I agree with the latter only. Pacification is where I make my niche. I reframe it as being one with the “big unit” war. Both schools tend to erroneously treat it as a separate event.

In that vein, I don’t see a fundamental difference in the war fought by Abrams from that of Westmoreland. I see new terminology and less resources, but the same focus and results. Similarly, I scoff at the Revisionist claim of Abrams being a savior general.

Let’s see—hmmm—that’s all I’ve got for now. I’m likely forgetting more of the minutia, but I’ve certainly covered the main points.