Blog from @JohnShirleyLtd
"The understaffing of customs clerks will become significant on 31 December 2020. Today, just a minority of forwarders retain customs clerks in EU, all of whom need *several years of training* The only remaining freight forwarder in Calais is Gondrand,

which has just three customs clerks. This greatly contrasts the 2,000 clerks that existed there in 1992, when there were approximately 40 freight forwarders.
A similar figure of clerks exists in Kent, with each clerk submitting 50 entries to customs per shift.

Given volume of traffic in the last 28 years has risen 400% each side of the Channel, the handful of customs clerks is demonstrably insufficient
Currently, a driver with intra-EU cargo simply drives from Factory A to Factory B, the only paperwork might be an invoice or CMR note.

But under customs clearance, British road-freight will have to join the queue with other non-EU cargo arriving at or departing from a customs depot. Yet, delivering goods by road to countries outside the EU can be burdensome for hauliers situated in a member state.

This is noticeable in how Croatian hauliers such as Autotransport Stjepan Radic regularly refuse loads to neighbouring Bosnia; they prefer loads coming from the EU. A key reason for this is that most hauliers lease rather than own their trucks outright. Trucks are very expensive

with a truck and trailer easily adding up to €100,000. This is attributable to modern trucks being heavily computerised and having to use authorised dealers for repairs and maintenance.
The trucks therefore have to be constantly used to offset these costs, along with the

financial burden of leases, road tolls, and fuel.
A second reason is that *drivers are scarce*, with more than half from member states being paid by the kilometre. This means drivers not on a salary are likely to quit and migrate to another haulier *carrying only intra-EU cargo*

At a risk to hauliers, they are essentially forced to avoid loads going outside the EU unless a very high price is agreed, should they have the correct permit.
However, this pushes the cost onto the non-EU exporter or importer.

This is why forwarders, when booking a load from the UK to Serbia for example, will generally use a Serbian haulier, or a Belarussian haulier to Belarus, to keep costs down.

Further issues arise when consignees fail to correctly arrange the import paperwork or permits,

resulting in the truck being potentially stuck at customs for days. This can force freight forwarders to seek demurrage from the shipper, which is currently £300 a day per truck.
Surprisingly, all this happens on borders or at delivery points

where there are a sufficient number of state-employed customs officers and customs clerks at freight forwarders.

However, this will certainly not be the case for Britain or EU on 1 January 2021. Hauliers are aware that both sides of the Channel are vastly understaffed

and deterred by the risk of serious delays, *requests for trucks to the UK by forwarders or factories will go unmet*

One only needs to look at the situation on the *EU external border* to see the potential for delays at Dover and Calais.

On the Croatian/Serbian border, it takes around six to eight hours to leave, and twice that to enter. This is further delayed inside Moldova, Ukraine or Serbia, where drivers are required to endure a second clearance at their destination, adding more hours to delivery.

While the exact figures are difficult to obtain and as yet, still up in the air, my calculations for the cost of the end of the transition period paint a bleak picture. Between the increased costs to British importers and exporters, the demurrage costs for goods possibly delayed

for a fortnight, multiplied by the thousands of trucks crossing the Channel, importers and exporters may be looking at an annual burden of more than £33 billion.
The long-term effects of customs clearance could be even more dire, similar perhaps, to *self-imposed sanctions*.

Full Blog in this tweet https://twitter.com/UCL_EI/status/1331211243714174981?s=20