1. Briefly coming out of my Twitter hiatus to offer up some thoughts on Yusuf al-Annabi's appointment as AQIM's new emir. A long(ish) thread to follow:

2. Annabi has been the head of AQIM's Council of Notables since 2010, a major leadership position. He's also been at the forefront of a lot of the group's propaganda initiatives and has played a role in AQ's wider global network and messaging.

3. It was Annabi who pledged allegiance to Zawahiri for AQIM following the death of Bin Laden in 2011. Annabi announced the response to the French intervention in Mali in 2013. He has tried to rally fighters in Syria and Libya. He has also opined on Algerian protests.

4. In an interview with @SimNasr last year, Annabi also outlined various facets of AQ's global management style. It would seem likely that Annabi has long played a management role within AQ's disperse leadership, not just in AQIM's.

5. Following the death of Droukdel earlier this year, France noted Droukdel was Zawahiri's "third deputy." This information was later repeated by US' AFRICOM. I find it unlikely given his stature within AQIM's ranks that Annabi wasn't also involved in this advisory role.

6. Whether or not Annabi now assumes Droukdel's former position as "third deputy," I don't know. But it's clear his influence extends from just AQIM's cadres. That said, Annabi certainly faces severe challenges now though he's likely already been involved in these efforts.

7. AQIM in Algeria is incredibly weak, while its Sahelian wing, JNIM, continues to face battles with the Islamic State's local branch. Annabi must now deal with trying to restructure in Algeria - if even possible - and with the jihadist infighting in the Sahel.

8. Some have spoken about the outsized role and importance of Iyad Ag Ghaly, JNIM's emir. While true that he leads a stronger group, Ghaly is ultimately loyal to AQIM and its leadership. Ghaly has not yet publicly renewed his bayah to Annabi, but is likely to do so.

9. This now gets into the common "isolated Algerian leadership" trope with AQIM vis a vis its relationship to JNIM. What the recent AQIM video implied is that Droukdel lived in northern Mali with JNIM or at least visited on multiple occasions.

10. Shortly before his death in northern Mali, local journalists also spoke of how Ag Ghaly called for a meeting with Droukdel. If Droukdel was isolated and removed from JNIM, why was he living with or visiting them on occasion and why would Ag Ghaly reportedly seek his counsel?

11. Of course, I don't know where Annabi is. But the last AQIM emir wasn't as isolated as some claim(ed). I've also seen some tack on the 2011-2012 understanding of AQIM in that the Algerian leadership has caused vast rifts between its North African and Sahelian ranks.

12. Most of this has been eliminated by the creation of JNIM, wherein local leaders have taken on a more outsized role. But as the recent AQIM video also notes, Droukdel was killed alongside a Dogon official within the group. AQIM/JNIM ranks are pretty ethnically diverse.

13. I also think it's a little too simplistic to characterize Annabi as just a propagandist. As the AQIM videos states, he joined the jihad around 1992/3 implying he was in GIA (or another group) before he joined the GSPC in the late 90s.

14. Seems very unlikely he'd go almost 30 years without any operational experience or behind-the-scenes efforts that allowed him to rise the ranks of AQIM's leadership. There's still a lot we don't know about Annabi's background.

15. In sum, Annabi does face some severe challenges to AQIM's 'core,' but its Sahelian wing is still an incredibly potent group. While he was mainly seen in propagandist/shari'a official roles, I think it is still too early to discount his threat as AQIM's emir at this stage.