If you want to curb corruption and mismanagement, audit people unexpectedly, right? "Be unpredictable!" a certain ex-President once said.
Maybe not.
A thread on @wendynassrwong's job market paper.
Maybe not.
A thread on @wendynassrwong's job market paper.
Wendy looked at largest social welfare program in human history: India's employment guarantee scheme. It gives people public works-style labor when needed.
As @karthik_econ likes to say when people ask him about external validity in India: "WHO CARES?" It's so huge.
As @karthik_econ likes to say when people ask him about external validity in India: "WHO CARES?" It's so huge.
Don't worry, though, there's a generalizable lesson coming.
Wendy gets program data from Jharkhand, where the timing of audits is randomized. When a local coordinator expects an audit, how do they change their behavior?
Wendy gets program data from Jharkhand, where the timing of audits is randomized. When a local coordinator expects an audit, how do they change their behavior?
Intuitively, most of us think that a small chance of an audit will be enough to change most people's behavior.
Implicitly, you're assuming there are decreasing returns to audit risk -- that people will get relatively less responsive as the certainty increases.
Implicitly, you're assuming there are decreasing returns to audit risk -- that people will get relatively less responsive as the certainty increases.
Also, you probably think that having times with 0 audit risk is just asking for bureaucrats to steal & mismanage.
Well, that's exactly what Jharkand did: randomize people's that they have zero risk sometimes, and known, quantifiable risks of audits (low and high) in other years
Well, that's exactly what Jharkand did: randomize people's that they have zero risk sometimes, and known, quantifiable risks of audits (low and high) in other years
Wendy suggests our intuition is wrong -- there are times when people have increasing returns to audit risk. This Indian program is one of them.
Bureaucrats don't ramp up signs of misappropriation when they have 0 risk, and don't respond to low audit risk. Only high risk.
Bureaucrats don't ramp up signs of misappropriation when they have 0 risk, and don't respond to low audit risk. Only high risk.
Think of it like cheating on taxes. Maybe a small risk of audit isn't enough to deter cheating. Some people will respond to high audit risk only -- a case of these increasing returns to audit risk.
What's interesting to me is what this implies for organizations that want to curb cheating or corruption or mismanagement -- they have to figure out what kind of subjects they have, and their responsiveness to risk.
For academics, if Wendy's findings prove correct in other places, I think the next task is to figure out a more general model for what conditions generate increasing or decreasing returns to audit risk. There are implications for taxes, crime, employee management, etc.
Email me, @k_sonin, @LuisRMartinezA or Canice Prendergast for effusive letters!
Finally, the first photo in this thread comes from one of my favorite photography exhibits, "Bureaucratics", by Jan Banning. Check it out: https://www.janbanning.com/gallery/bureaucratics/
Here is Wendy's web page: https://wendynassrwong.github.io