I& #39;ve written a few things on leader turnover and war, all of which hinge on the idea that incumbents can& #39;t fully pre-commit their successors to inherited foreign policies. This piece suggests an additional, domestic wrinkle. (1/x) https://www.axios.com/trump-administration-iran-sanctions-january-3951f776-09c9-4e55-b0f5-4a9c80e9e974.html">https://www.axios.com/trump-adm...

Incumbents can still try to insulate foreign policies, making it harder than it otherwise would be for a successor to change them. Sometimes, you do that by signing an alliance, which typically stays in place beyond the leader who signs it. (2/x)

Other times you can try either (a) poison the well and make rapprochement harder or (b), as seems to be part of the strategy here, reframe the issues: sanction not a nuke program but things like ballistic missiles that would be harder to make a positive case for lifting. (3/x)

Reminds me of the policy insulation story here, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3118028 ,">https://www.jstor.org/stable/31... though the role of the foreign state would probably need to be part of a broader theory of foreign policy insulation by lame ducks. (4/x)

And for a summary of work on impending leader change and foreign policy, see this MC post I wrote with @wucathyx. (5/x) https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/10/21/how-possible-biden-victory-is-shaping-international-politics-even-before-nov-3/">https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/...