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Honored to close out this series by @JoshAGoldstein & @noUpside. Are foreign influence operations overhyped?
Yes, to an extent. @DFRLab tracked 80 U.S. allegations since 2018, most of which have come to nothing.
But beyond the U.S.? Absolutely not. https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-influence-operations-after-2020
Yes, to an extent. @DFRLab tracked 80 U.S. allegations since 2018, most of which have come to nothing.
But beyond the U.S.? Absolutely not. https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-influence-operations-after-2020
Each contributor brought a unique perspective to the "overhyped" question. For @rosenbergerlm & @LindsayPGorman, influence operations represent one facet of the broader information conflict between democracies and autocracies: certainly not overhyped. https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-interference-strategy-not-tactic
For @DarrenLinvill & @plwarre, similarly not overhyped. It's all about perception-hacking.
"Foreign operations don’t have to be successful in whatever overt goal they may have—they simply have to exist.” https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-influence-operations-after-2020
"Foreign operations don’t have to be successful in whatever overt goal they may have—they simply have to exist.” https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-influence-operations-after-2020
For @YochaiBenkler, foreign influence ops *are* overhyped. And this is largely a media problem.
“To appear powerful...all Russian actors need to do is make sure they are described as powerful and dangerous by credible sources in the United States." https://www.lawfareblog.com/danger-overstating-impact-information-operations
“To appear powerful...all Russian actors need to do is make sure they are described as powerful and dangerous by credible sources in the United States." https://www.lawfareblog.com/danger-overstating-impact-information-operations
@cward1e sees an "overcorrection" in how much these operations are covered. This has given rise to a “disinformation industrial complex,” powered by a “zealous belief that Russians [are] under every bed.” It has also stolen oxygen from important causes. https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-influence-operations-after-2020
Finally, @j_a_tucker notes how exaggerated influence of foreign trolls is not substantiated by data. In particular, he observes the trivial reach of the Russian effort as compared to that of presidential candidates and partisan influencers. https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-influence-operations-after-2020
For my part, I worry about the use of "disinformation" rhetoric to erode civil liberties abroad. See recent, aggressive speech codes by Thailand, Egypt, Singapore, and elsewhere. @gabriellelim has a great piece on this. https://www.cigionline.org/articles/risks-exaggerating-foreign-influence-operations-and-disinformation
I'm also worried about the field when donors lose interest in the "disinformation problem" (and they will).
Remember: it was a good time to be a so-called counterterrorism expert in Washington, D.C. in 2002; less so by 2011. How might standards slip as the money gets scarce?
Remember: it was a good time to be a so-called counterterrorism expert in Washington, D.C. in 2002; less so by 2011. How might standards slip as the money gets scarce?
Finally, foreign influence operations DO matter overseas, in more fragile and less monitored information environments. See recent efforts targeting Bolivia, Libya, Yemen, and nearly a dozen nations in West Africa.
Folks in these countries can't call friends at Facebook...
Folks in these countries can't call friends at Facebook...
Again, great series by @JoshAGoldstein & @noUpside and fantastic editing by @qjurecic.
We can't know what the future holds this next perilous week, but now we have a slightly better idea. https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-influence-operations-and-2020-election-framing-debate
We can't know what the future holds this next perilous week, but now we have a slightly better idea. https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-influence-operations-and-2020-election-framing-debate
