Thread by @etbrooking, Honored to close out this series by @JoshAGoldstein & @noUpside. Are foreign [...]

Honored to close out this series by @JoshAGoldstein & @noUpside. Are foreign influence operations overhyped?

Yes, to an extent. @DFRLab tracked 80 U.S. allegations since 2018, most of which have come to nothing.

But beyond the U.S.? Absolutely not. https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-influence-operations-after-2020">https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-i...

Foreign Influence Operations After 2020

The past four years have seen extraordinary growth in the study of foreign influence and social media manipulation. Over the next four years, the field will need to move toward sustainability and

https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-influence-operations-after-2020

Each contributor brought a unique perspective to the "overhyped" question. For @rosenbergerlm & @LindsayPGorman, influence operations represent one facet of the broader information conflict between democracies and autocracies: certainly not overhyped. https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-interference-strategy-not-tactic">https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-i...

Foreign Interference is a Strategy, Not a Tactic

Authoritarians’ use of influence operations must be understood as part of a larger strategy to reshape the information space into one that is less democratic and more friendly to despots.

https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-interference-strategy-not-tactic

For @DarrenLinvill & @plwarre, similarly not overhyped. It& #39;s all about perception-hacking.

"Foreign operations don’t have to be successful in whatever overt goal they may have—they simply have to exist.” https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-influence-operations-after-2020">https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-i...

Foreign Influence Operations After 2020

The past four years have seen extraordinary growth in the study of foreign influence and social media manipulation. Over the next four years, the field will need to move toward sustainability and

https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-influence-operations-after-2020

For @YochaiBenkler, foreign influence ops *are* overhyped. And this is largely a media problem.

“To appear powerful...all Russian actors need to do is make sure they are described as powerful and dangerous by credible sources in the United States." https://www.lawfareblog.com/danger-overstating-impact-information-operations">https://www.lawfareblog.com/danger-ov...

The Danger of Overstating the Impact of Information Operations

The evidence that there are Russian information operations aimed at the United States is overwhelming. But there is no publicly available evidence that establishes that these operations have made any

https://www.lawfareblog.com/danger-overstating-impact-information-operations

@cward1e sees an "overcorrection" in how much these operations are covered. This has given rise to a “disinformation industrial complex,” powered by a “zealous belief that Russians [are] under every bed.” It has also stolen oxygen from important causes. https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-influence-operations-after-2020">https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-i...

Foreign Influence Operations After 2020

The past four years have seen extraordinary growth in the study of foreign influence and social media manipulation. Over the next four years, the field will need to move toward sustainability and

https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-influence-operations-after-2020

Finally, @j_a_tucker notes how exaggerated influence of foreign trolls is not substantiated by data. In particular, he observes the trivial reach of the Russian effort as compared to that of presidential candidates and partisan influencers. https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-influence-operations-after-2020">https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-i...

Foreign Influence Operations After 2020

The past four years have seen extraordinary growth in the study of foreign influence and social media manipulation. Over the next four years, the field will need to move toward sustainability and

https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-influence-operations-after-2020

For my part, I worry about the use of "disinformation" rhetoric to erode civil liberties abroad. See recent, aggressive speech codes by Thailand, Egypt, Singapore, and elsewhere. @gabriellelim has a great piece on this. https://www.cigionline.org/articles/risks-exaggerating-foreign-influence-operations-and-disinformation">https://www.cigionline.org/articles/...

The Risks of Exaggerating Foreign Influence Operations and Disinformation

Bad actors will always try to interfere with information systems, but we can choose to make voting easier, prevent gerrymandering, and amend or repeal laws that lead to voter suppression.

https://www.cigionline.org/articles/risks-exaggerating-foreign-influence-operations-and-disinformation

I& #39;m also worried about the field when donors lose interest in the "disinformation problem" (and they will).

Remember: it was a good time to be a so-called counterterrorism expert in Washington, D.C. in 2002; less so by 2011. How might standards slip as the money gets scarce?

Finally, foreign influence operations DO matter overseas, in more fragile and less monitored information environments. See recent efforts targeting Bolivia, Libya, Yemen, and nearly a dozen nations in West Africa.

Folks in these countries can& #39;t call friends at Facebook...

Again, great series by @JoshAGoldstein & @noUpside and fantastic editing by @qjurecic.

We can& #39;t know what the future holds this next perilous week, but now we have a slightly better idea. https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-influence-operations-and-2020-election-framing-debate">https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-i...

Foreign Influence Operations and the 2020 Election: Framing the Debate

Introducing a series from the Stanford Internet Observatory on assessing the threat of foreign influence operations targeting the United States.

https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-influence-operations-and-2020-election-framing-debate

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