Read on Twitter
Since writing intelligence and spirit's chapter on Boltzmann, I have slowly realized the disquieting significance of Boltzmann's the drawer-pulling experiment mentioned in his correspondence with Brentano. The thought experiment is itself ...
... a blade with multiple edges targeting at once established dogmas regarding temporal perception, phenomenal permanence of an objects's aspects and the phenomenological continuity of a perceptual object.
In a very crude sense, the drawer-opening experiment is as simple as putting an object in a drawer, closing it and upon opening it expecting it to contain the same object or anything at all. In a sense, it's perceptual problem generator in the sense that ...
When it comes to perception, how can we ever generate a genuine problem by understanding 'where' the problem is.
For example, one problem coming from the drawer-opening experiment is the translation of discretely time-stamped images of an object to a continuous temporal image endowed with a phenomenal stability. Example:
You put a pen in the drawer, close the drawer and expect that upon opening the drawer you will see a pen and not a piece of paper. What if the closing-opening of the drawer could be thoughts as a time interval in perceiving an object and furthermore, what if there ...
..And what if this time interval could be represented a daemon who replaces the pen with the book or another object. In other words, there is no obvious way to move analytical temporal statements about an object to synthetic statements. And this have phenomenological consequences
@induceoxytocin It has in epistemology. Re semantics, I suspect so, but then requires a certain kind of explicit link between phenomenological problems and the semantic dimension of let's say natural language. Some of Claude Vandeloise's works get close to this.
This particularly: https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/S/bo3628047.html
