Like @jonworth I’m not impressed with this piece on post-Brexit EU bu UK constitutional guru Vernon Bogdanor. A thread on one particular aspect of his argument https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/oct/25/brexit-was-no-aberration-the-european-union-needs-to-learn-from-it

Based on last decade or so, this quote is well wide of the mark:
“There is, paradoxically, a sense in which Brexit Britain, together with Gaullist France, were in the vanguard of European development, rather than hindrances to it”

Yes, UK and France are similar socio-economically, and have confronted similar populist challenges in their domestic politics, especially in the form of resentment towards the EU and public policies on immigration – both of which are closely bound up with EU membership.

Both countries had big problems ratifying Maastricht treaty in 1992; both had vocal Eurosceptic movements railing against alleged social dumping associated with eastern enlargement

So by the time the Lisbon Treaty was ratified (2010), London and Paris were equally nervous about how to manage EU policy in the face of entrenched Euroscepticism in their domestic politics

Fast-forward a decade and the path taken by France and the UK could hardly look more different. Why? Some thoughts.

France stuck with EU membership while seeking to pursue technical reforms that could deflect populist demands.

UK responded to the populist challenge by querying EU membership and eventually pursued withdrawal after 2016 referendum.

Rejection of EU Constitutional Treaty by French voters in 2005 was crucial. After that, French political elites chose not to go full populist. Chief aim remains to benefit from and lead the way in European integration.

See this in technocratic approach of Hollande and Macron to manage constraints of Euro and change EU institutions, foreign, and domestic policy in line with French preferences

UK, conversely, gets extremely defensive from 2010. Expectations of getting its own way fail to meet reality of EU direction of travel. Abandons leadership ambitions.

When Cameron’s approach fails to quell UKIP, he goes all in with referendum as a threat for getting what he wants. The rest is history… [end]