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I agree that we often have an idealized vision of the past state of transatlantic relations, but I think you're falling into this trap vis a vis Obama admin. U.S.-German relations, for the most part (Snowden?) were good or very good, but that was not the case for much of Europe. https://twitter.com/ulrichspeck/status/1319919640827600896
From the start, many in Central Europe felt that the Obama administration, intent on the "reset" with Russia, was willing to at best go over their heads, and at worst abandon them: https://bit.ly/3mdTRyO
Remember the other big Obama admin initiative in that first year? The attempted G2 with China, which would, if successful, have relegated the Europeans to the kids table... https://on.ft.com/2TqRgVI
Relations with Europe were put on a firmer path after that, but during the first term, there was significant anxiety throughout Europe about the Obama admin's "pivot" to Asia, the transatlantic impacts of which were not clearly communicated to allies: https://brook.gs/37JNZt1
Putin's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and invasion of Ukraine challenged the relationship as well. Yes, the allies eventually began to to coordinate a response, but the Obama administration was often sluggish to go as far as many in the East wanted https://brook.gs/2HDm4jG
And what about the ME? Paris spent the later years of the Obama admin telling everyone in DC who would listen about the catastrophic impact of U.S. disengagement from the ME on European security and on the region (warnings that turned out to be prophetic) https://on.wsj.com/3mpuOsL
Libya, the failed red line in Syria, the counter-ISIS fight, disputes over burden sharing in Africa. The Obama administration wanted the Europeans to do more, but did not consistently make clear how much allies were expected to contribute. https://nyti.ms/3jtFK6z
None of this is to minimize the damage that the Trump admin has done to transatlantic relations (it's significant). But looking at this track record over 12 yrs of Obama-Trump shows a remarkable amount of continuity on substance that is masked by the stylistic differences.
Because of the Obama-Merkel relationship, Germany was insulated from the worst effects of the beginning of U.S. disengagement from European security and the ME. It also began to free ride off others in Europe who started to try to tackle the challenges the US left behind.
The atmospherics and commitment to multilateral approaches on Iran, climate, etc. from a Biden administration would obviously help set a different tone, but the underlying structural changes are still moving in the same direction...
a United States less willing to assume the same level of responsibility for Europe's security and European allies with varied threat perspectives and priorities and Germany at the center still uncertain of its own willingness/ability to lead. https://bit.ly/3kuguhY
