I will compose a thread soon, now I can just point out a few points I will argue for: 1. If inference to the best explanation characterizes science (and should), then there is hardly a rational criterion by which we can differentiate lay reasoning from scientific inquiry. 1/n
2. There is a big difference between inferring "before the fact" and "after the fact": The former pertains to testing, the latter to interpretation. All organisms interpret, but not all engage in testing. 2/n
3. Peirce's abduction (even if we assume that it is similar to inference to the best explanation) is not proposed as the scientific method. It is involved in one aspect of inquiry, and that is not justification. 3/n
In connection, scientific inquiry is not reducible to the scientific method (however we understand it), but this does not mean that the other aspects (incl bouts of creativity) can replace or substitute methodology. 4/n
And scientific methodology is not reducible to the logic of science. E.g. there are methodological dimensions in Popper's "naive" falsificationism such as corroboration and verisimilitude that go beyond logical inferencing. But these do not redefine what inferencing is. 5/n
4. Those who criticize evo psych don't necessarily endorse a "naive" falsificationist view of science. They often criticize the inadequate level of justification. It is one thing to argue that the way claims are justified in evo psch doesn't fit falsificationist constraints, 6/n
and it is a completely different thing to argue that inference to the best explanation is better than the "faulty", "outdated" falsificationist methodology. I guess the implication is that evo psych is even more scientific than other fields that test their claims. 7/n
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