I'm sorry, but the Taiwan section is such an oversimplification--and perhaps a misread--of the actual dynamics at play. 1/ https://twitter.com/niubi/status/1319735234284425216

Yes, public opinion polls show that the majority want the status quo. This is because they know what the alternative would be. And to be clear, because the article somehow places the onus of blame on Washington, ("incurring the risks of a dangerous U.S.-backed attempt")... 2/

any military action against Taiwan would be instigated by China, which has never renounced the use of force.

Look at public opinions polls on what the majority would want if there were guarantees that China would not launch an attack & their way of life could be preserved. 3/

Perhaps the most telling public opinion poll is on Taiwanese identity, trending towards "uniquely Taiwanese" and away from "both Taiwanese and Chinese" and just "Chinese," as well as the people's wholesale rejection of "One Country, Two Systems." 4/

The article stands by the hope of a "reconciliation of cross-Strait differences," but right now the views of the two sides (worth stressing, Taiwan's *people* along w/ its government on one and the CCP on the other) are perhaps as divergent as they have ever been. 5/

Further, its up in the air right now whether the KMT will be able to maintain its position as a counterbalance in cross-Strait politics--there's infighting among its leadership--and its unclear how they will reassess their policy priorities. 6/

More importantly, however, Beijing appears to be losing patience with the KMT and losing confidence that the party can help it bring Taiwan back into the fold and closer to China. 7/

Accordingly, tensions were on the rise irrespective of what the U.S. is doing because of these domestic trends. Worth stressing also that Tsai has consistently reaffirmed her commitment to the status quo. 8/

I'm constantly struck by why the blame is always on Washington & the view that cross-Strait relations are somehow static and unchanging and that we should keep to sticking to the same policy approaches. 9/

It is reasonable to suggests policy shifts--w/ in the framework of our "One China" policy, which we define--to adjust to new developments and we have done as much over the years (see: Taiwan democratization) 10/

I'm not saying the U.S. should scrap its hope for a peaceful resolution, but how do we contend with the fact that trends aren't headed in that direction? I don't have an answer, but I know it's not beating the same dead horse. /End