Others have commented on much of this piece, but I think the reference to the differences between May and Johnson on Northern Ireland - presented as an unalloyed gain - merits comment. It misses the real point of the shift by the EU and the UK, and the implications for NI. 1/ https://twitter.com/JGForsyth/status/1319219961714348032

Yes, the consent mechanism was a real shift from the EU, allowing a simple majority of the Assembly to decide whether to opt out of the Protocol every four years. But as a concession, it replaced the customs union May secured between GB and the EU-plus-NI. 2/

From an EU point of view, it was a smaller concession - even if we add in the reborn customs partnership, this time for NI alone and not the whole UK. May had persuaded the EU, in effect, to set something of a baseline for GB as well as NI - which it had always resisted. 3/

But it was a *preferable* concession for Johnson, because May prioritised minimising GB/NI divergence while he prioritised GB's freedom to diverge, and she cared about NI while he was indifferent. It turned out that the Conservative and Purportedly Unionist Party agreed. 4/

As a result, we traded convergence for consent. Rather than reducing divergence on either side for NI so far as the UK determination to end free movement and the EU interpretation of single market integrity allowed, NI was given a stark choice so GB could head off unimpeded. 5/

That is far more economically damaging for NI than May's backstop would have been. It could also be deeply destabilising, turning Stormont elections into a proxy vote on borders from 2022 onwards. It inserts a stark majoritarian choice into a usually consociational settlement. 6/

For me, the impact on NI made the difference between heavy-hearted acceptance and rejection of the deal on the table in 2019. The very different Tory view is a big reason I don't buy the belated outrage over the Protocol or the No Deal hue and cry now. 7/7 https://medium.com/@dijdowell/not-all-brexit-deals-are-alike-507cf36bb876