<THREAD> Observations on the @mgordonwsj/ @AMSimmons1 @wsj story on the New START extension/warhead freeze story.

BLUF: A deal is possible--and I'd likely support it--but it won't live up to the admin's own standards.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-russia-near-deal-to-extend-new-start-treaty-freeze-warheads-for-a-year-11603197012?

First off, as @KingstonAReif points out in the story, what's left to sort out isn't simple.

Definitions and verification aren't usually the most *contentious* part of arms control negotiation but are often the most *time consuming.* (2/n)

Second, the source ( @USArmsControl, I'd assume) points to the perimeter portal monitoring used in the INF Treaty as a precedent (essentially scanning everything that leaves a facility).

While this establishes the *principle* of PPM, it doesn't establish *practicality*. (3/n)

The INF treaty limited missiles--which are large and easy to detect (with X-rays as it happens). Warheads are smaller and more challenging to detect. I'm not saying it's impossible--I am saying that the INF approach can't be applied without extensive modifications. (4/n)

Side note. If you want to geek out on INF Treaty verification, here's your source: https://www.dtra.mil/Portals/61/Documents/History/On-Site%20Inspections%20INF%20Treaty-opt.pdf (5/n)

Indeed--and here's the key point--the admin itself recognizes these problems!

They accept that the best they can get is for Russia to agree to negotiate over verification arrangements. (6/n)

So here we are:

Trump administration: We don't trust Russia to comply with a warhead freeze.

Also Trump administration: We would trust Russia to negotiate in good faith over verification arrangements.

You see the problem?

(7/n)

As I said before: (8/n) https://twitter.com/james_acton32/status/1316114283139403777?s=20

Ultimately, a one year warhead freeze isn't a bad idea. But, given where we're at right now, let's not pretend that it's going to be verifiable. (9/9)