Read on Twitter
I& #39;m seeing a lot of this interpretation of recent PLA exercises near Taiwan. There& #39;s plenty that I think is implausible about this argument but let me focus on two: timing, and expected costs. https://twitter.com/petesweeneypro/status/1318451745190604800">https://twitter.com/petesween...
First, is time "not on China& #39;s side"? If we think of the main obstacle to unification not as what& #39;s happening in Taiwan, but rather the US, then this seems wrong.
In fact, @RushDoshi has argued that PRC elites think the US is in accelerating decline: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/12/china-trump-accelerating-american-decline/">https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/1...
In fact, @RushDoshi has argued that PRC elites think the US is in accelerating decline: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/12/china-trump-accelerating-american-decline/">https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/1...
So has @JulianGewirtz, here: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-13/china-thinks-america-losing">https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/...
Both argue that Beijing& #39;s perception is that America is becoming weaker, and more dangerous, with rising deficits, political polarization, & governance challenges that COVID-19 has laid bare.
In long run, this means (in CCP view) China will surpass US faster than expected.
In long run, this means (in CCP view) China will surpass US faster than expected.
If that& #39;s your view of the power balance trends, then what& #39;s the rush on "resolving" the Taiwan issue?
If China will be stronger and US much weaker in 20 years, then why not wait it out until that moment arrives? Xi can (in theory) afford to since he faces no term limits...
If China will be stronger and US much weaker in 20 years, then why not wait it out until that moment arrives? Xi can (in theory) afford to since he faces no term limits...
So the idea that there& #39;s only a three-month window (Nov 2020-Jan 2021) to invade Taiwan while US is distracted, & crucially, one that will NEVER come again, does not seem to be one that Chinese elites themselves share.
Why risk it now, in other words?
Why risk it now, in other words?
The second part is size of that risk. An attempted invasion of Taiwan would be an enormous gamble for Xi Jinping.
1st, leave aside blockade, missile strike, or seizure of outlying islands, b/c none of these end with Taiwan proper under PRC control.
1st, leave aside blockade, missile strike, or seizure of outlying islands, b/c none of these end with Taiwan proper under PRC control.
It has to be an invasion that "resolves" the Taiwan issue in order for Xi to reap the domestic benefits that *might* make up for the huge costs China will certainly bear. Those are:
Economic: trade disrupted, stock markets go haywire, potential sanctions from US and EU.
Economic: trade disrupted, stock markets go haywire, potential sanctions from US and EU.
Reputational: No more "peaceful rise" claims. The rest of region probably coalesces into an anti-China defense coalition. US posture toward PRC turns openly hostile, possibly for decades.
That& #39;s a world which makes achieving all PRC& #39;s foreign policy goals much HARDER.
That& #39;s a world which makes achieving all PRC& #39;s foreign policy goals much HARDER.
Note I haven& #39;t even talked yet about the problem of actually pulling off an invasion. Which is really hard!
It& #39;s a 90-mile strait at its narrowest point. Hard to cross undetected, & invasion force is vulnerable for hours, as Michael Beckley argues:
https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/ISEC_a_00294">https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfpl...
It& #39;s a 90-mile strait at its narrowest point. Hard to cross undetected, & invasion force is vulnerable for hours, as Michael Beckley argues:
https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/ISEC_a_00294">https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfpl...
The PLA has no relevant war fighting experience for this. CCP leaders don& #39;t know how they& #39;d perform if called on to attack. There are lots of reasons for them to worry about a military fiasco (even if the US isn& #39;t involved!): https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/the-chinese-military-speaks-to-itself-revealing-doubts/">https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/t...
And if the US attempts to get involved? Well, the PLA has spent the last 20 years building an A2/AD trap for the United States, for just this scenario.
It& #39;s made defending Taiwan a really hard problem for the Pentagon to plan for: https://www.economist.com/asia/2020/10/10/defending-taiwan-is-growing-costlier-and-deadlier">https://www.economist.com/asia/2020...
It& #39;s made defending Taiwan a really hard problem for the Pentagon to plan for: https://www.economist.com/asia/2020/10/10/defending-taiwan-is-growing-costlier-and-deadlier">https://www.economist.com/asia/2020...
But springing that trap also requires risking a full-on hot conflict with the US.
And even if US isn& #39;t willing to take that on for Taiwan, it& #39;s ALSO a crucial test for the US commitment to other partners and allies in the region. Like Japan: https://www.tokyoreview.net/2020/07/taiwan-is-where-japan-draws-the-line/">https://www.tokyoreview.net/2020/07/t...
And even if US isn& #39;t willing to take that on for Taiwan, it& #39;s ALSO a crucial test for the US commitment to other partners and allies in the region. Like Japan: https://www.tokyoreview.net/2020/07/taiwan-is-where-japan-draws-the-line/">https://www.tokyoreview.net/2020/07/t...
The risk-reward ratio for Beijing right now just doesn& #39;t seem close.
On one hand, a shot (well under even odds) at taking over Taiwan w/o a fight.
On the other, hot conflict with US (and Japan).
& either way, almost certain sacrifice of other policy goals for a generation.
On one hand, a shot (well under even odds) at taking over Taiwan w/o a fight.
On the other, hot conflict with US (and Japan).
& either way, almost certain sacrifice of other policy goals for a generation.
