An application of Aumann& #39;s agreeing-to-disagree result: certain kinds of war between rational countries are puzzling.

Since war involves destruction, better for one to surrender and bargain. But maybe each believes it& #39;ll get more by fighting? Suppose a country fights iff

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it thinks it will win with prob > 0.5. In the notation below, let X = indicator that I win. Then war means it& #39;s common knowledge that Y>.5>Z.

That& #39;s impossible, but the proof below doesn& #39;t quite show it. Exercise: show there& #39;s no CK event E on which Y>Z. https://twitter.com/ben_golub/status/1318231515797594113?s=20">https://twitter.com/ben_golub...
War here is like speculative trade (cf. no-trade theorem): it can& #39;t happen due to different information ALONE, because by Aumann both of us can& #39;t rationally expect to win.

Thus, if war is zero-sum or worse, it entails irrationality or different priors.

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(A darker possible explanation is that, taking only elites& #39; interests into account, war actually generates "surplus" -- both would agree to it even if neither expected to win.)
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