1. I do my best not to editorialise here (with mixed success), but here's a thread/rant.

2. I have time for the idea that is playing off and to extract increased benefit from both. But this article repeats various frustrating elements of reporting on China in Cambodia (rehashing old reporting, speculation, innuendo, gap-filling). https://asiatimes.com/2020/10/cambodia-playing-us-to-squeeze-more-from-china/

3. Preface: The UDG project is highly problematic for a host of reasons (environmental, human rights, transparency, etc etc); Prince Group is shady as hell; something is up at Ream. No free passes. But…

4. On UDG/military base: *The alternative alleged site of a possible future Chinese military base in Cambodia is a $3.8 billion “tourism resort” in Koh Kong province, close to the Ream Naval Base.*

5. Scare quotes suggest all is not as it seems. But UDG has signed deals with casino operators, and is actively promoting sale of homes/land to wealthy Chinese and companies. The fact that project is not yet a tourism mecca speaks more to unrealistic vision than it being a front.

6. A more grounded story on the UDG project could look at the background of some of the various private enterprises that have signed agreements with UDG, where their money comes from (hint: it rhymes with borganized slime), and why/how so many have Cambodian passports.

7. The UDG project was approved several years before China’s rise to prominence in Cambodia. Limited evidence has been put forward that this is to be a military base. Facilities such as the airport COULD have dual use, but I need to see something more conclusive than that.

8. UDG as state entity: *Union Development Group, the Chinese state-run developer of the project* UDG was registered in the 90s as a private property developer in Tianjin. Its founder is a billionaire and was once on the China Forbes Richlist.

9. The Cambodia operation is run by his family members. The only suggestion that it is state owned/controlled comes from the US government, which has provided no evidence to support this.

10. Company records in China indicate it remains a private enterprise. If the US had evidence to the contrary, I would assume they would release it. If they do, I will happily:

11. UDG as military base: *US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said at the time that there were “credible reports” that the Dara Sakor development “could be used to host [Chinese] military assets.”* We must do more than just quote ’s strategic rival...

12. ...especially when led by someone as hawkish and with such limited concern for facts as Mr. Pompeo. Much of the narrative on UDG’s military links comes from the Harbored Ambitions report, which contains several errors and (in my view) some questionable judgements.

13. On Chen Zhi: *Some sources who spoke to Asia Times suggest that Chen and his Prince Group could be associated with the United Front Work Department*. This is a pretty serious scoop, but I need more than “some sources” say Chen “could be” United Front.

14. Chinese language online media regularly refer to Chen as an online gambling mastermind. Given Prince’s highly opaque finances and Beijing’s current crackdown on the industry, I’d be surprised if he was courting/being courted by Beijing to further Chinese gov. interests.

15. Mention of Chen in the same breath as the Ream base and the Cambodia-China FTA, seems to draw the reader into assuming there are linkages, when there is no evidence I am aware of that demonstrates any connection.

16. *The FTA will have marginal benefits ... but is plumb with geopolitical significance.* I wouldn’t be so quick to dismiss the significance, especially as the text is not yet public. It will likely catalyse further investment and aid into agro-industry and processing sector.

17. *The signing ceremony was a relatively modest affair, as Cambodia’s Minister of Commerce Pan Sorasak signed the pact instead of Hun Sen, who watched in the wings alongside China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi*

18. It wasn’t that modest, it dominated media for at least 3 days, and FTAs relate to commerce, so it is unremarkable that the agreement was signed by the 2 commerce ministers (with Cambodia PM and very senior Chinese official witnessing).

19. *Aside from the FTA, Wang also pledged an additional $140 million in aid to Cambodia this week, a figure coincidentally close to the $150 million that the US earmarked last month for Cambodia*

20. It quite likely was a coincidence. These aid/loan packages are not assembled over night and require months of negotiation and preparation.

21. *From ’s perspective, America’s latest geo-economic overture to rival may provide an ideal moment for Phnom Penh to play one superpower off against the other, a tried and tested way of extracting the greatest financial benefit from each side.* This I agree with

22. *“A major reason why countries [have moved into China’s orbit] is because China is coercing them…threatening economic sanction or diplomatic isolation, or doing other things. We also see China enticing countries [with loans that] end up being debt traps* US Defense Secretary

23. Here’s the rub. US strategy in Cambodia and the wider Asia-Pacific is in disarray. It seems unable to come to terms with the fact that its regional influence has declined (and will continue to), and that China’s will continue to rise.

24. Unable to counter this, the falls back on repeated assertions of coercion, threats, and predatory lending. All of this omits discussion/analysis of local AGENCY and host country PRIORITIES and overplays a false vision of the Chinese state and capital as a monolithic force.

25. Until is able to acknowledge the reality and complexity of role in and beyond, IMHO it is unlikely to regain a stronger strategic footing. As for the “debt trap” meme. There is an extensive/growing body of literature available that solidly debunks this narrative.

26. Articles that focus on the suspicious Chinese and apparently accept US statements at face value do little to move this discussion forward. The second half of the article raises interesting discussion, but let’s stop prefacing and burying that discussion...

27. ...in recycled reporting and innuendo. And please, let’s stop accepting US statements on China as inherently reliable, when this State Department under Pompeo has illustrated time and again that it is not a reliable actor.

28. OK. I used up rant privileges for the next month. Going for a lie down.