Some good recent research on Chinese data reliability: the basic conclusion is that the government has consistently falsified official GDP since 2012.

But it& #39;s also a bit more complicated than that. Here& #39;s the story, and a short thread: https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2020/10/15/can-chinas-reported-growth-be-trusted">https://www.economist.com/finance-a... (1/x)

Specifically, real GDP growth has been abnormally smooth. But there& #39;s disagreement about the direction of misreporting. @CapEconChina sees consistent over-reporting. Net effect: whereas official GDP grew by 48% in total from 2014 to 2019, they put the true expansion at 33%. (2/x)

Economists with the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco see more two-sided manipulation, such that growth has actually been a little faster than officially reported about half the time. Either way, official growth data has become less reliable since 2013. (3/x)

But before dismissing all China data as therefore manipulated, it& #39;s important to note two things. First, nominal data actually looks much more volatile and more credible. It& #39;s in the translation to real growth (choice of the deflator) that the NBS seems to be fiddling. (4/x)

Second, the Fed economists compared China& #39;s non-GDP data to others& #39; exports to China (ie, data independent from China). Their view: apart from real GDP, many Chinese indicators have actually become more reliable -- hence allowing for GDP proxies. (5/x) https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261560620302187?via%3Dihub">https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/a...

And while the proxies differ in their analysis of the depth of China& #39;s contraction earlier this year during its covid lockdown, they are in agreement that the rebound since then has been big. (6/6) https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2020/10/15/can-chinas-reported-growth-be-trusted">https://www.economist.com/finance-a...