1/ Okay, continuing the Friday night crowdsourced Navy knowledge thing: ~20 years ago (12 OCT 2000, to be precise) I was part of the wardroom in USS COLE (DDG 67) when the ship was attacked by terrorists in Aden, Yemen. Thread continues:

2/ I don’t claim to have sublime knowledge – just observations from a seminal moment in my life. Many of you will already know the stuff I’ll lay out – and that’s great! I hope to help a little and have a drink poured; please ask me anything.

3/ We were in Aden for a “brief stop for fuel,” (BSF) which is just as it sounds – you pull your ship into port, refuel, and leave. < 1 day. Terrorists killed 17 of my shipmates by detonating a bomb, hidden in a small boat, next to the hull. 37 shipmates were injured.

4/ I was a LT (an O3) and the Operations Officer (OPS), one of the department heads (DHs) in the ship. I had reported in March 2000, during the pre-deployment work-ups. We had deployed in August 2000. I was 10 days past my 30th birthday when the attack happened.

5/ That (30) may sound old to some, but it seems really really young to me now. My training had prepared me for emergencies, but you never really know what might happen. We certainly didn’t think two terrorists would suicide-bomb our ship from a small boat.

6/ I was the Command Duty Officer (CDO) in Aden, meaning I was in charge of the duty section – the Sailors standing watch on a ship in port. As CDO, the actions of the duty section were my responsibility. Unsurprisingly, the experience shaped each day of my career since.

7/ As the CDO, I was (rightly) named in the investigation that followed. JAGMANs are never fun, and the investigators found several things we should have done but did not. In the end, the chain of command determined that (if anyone) only the CO would be held accountable.

8/ Much has been written about the attack, including the captain’s excellent book, “Front Burner,” but I’ll cover what I learned during, after, and well-after the attack. 1st: of course every day since the attack has been a “bonus day,” both being alive & being allowed to serve.

9/ Along those lines, the experience has given me perspective on what’s a bad day and what isn’t. I have literally had to mutter to myself on more than one occasion, “at least I don’t have a big hole in the side of my ship.” It helps me remember what’s important.

10/ I find that when I fail to keep that perspective (because I do, from time to time), I really beat myself up. I know then that I’m letting my shipmates down.

11/ 2nd big observation: People will surprise you in a crisis. I had Sailors surprise me by being everywhere and doing everything. I had other Sailors I’d expected to be dynamos who were not. In general, many Sailors needed just a little push to get them going

12/ We would ask them where their GQ (general quarters = battle stations) station was; that question would usually be enough to break inertia, and they’d head off to where they needed to be. I don’t exempt myself here – I’m embarrassed remember how long I spent …

13/ fumbling with an M9, trying to figure out if it had a round chambered (it did) before realizing I had other things to do – as the CDO and certainly as OPS, my job was to get a message off the ship, and take charge of the response. (I did get my act together)

14/ 3rd big observation: you are never as clear a communicator as you think. Sailors will fill in the blanks you leave for them. Example: I believed my duty section & I were more closely aligned than we were. Several Sailors thought an officer had to give them an order to shoot.

15/ This is not to say our Sailors had any reason to shoot the little boat carrying the (concealed) bomb and the two guys. There was no way we met the criteria for lethal force. Point is, my Sailors didn’t understand my intent.

16/ We had done deadly force training over and over, but the key point – you may INDIVIDUALLY have to decide to use deadly force – was NOT as clear as I’d thought. I made a big deal about this later, both in my 2nd DH tour (different ship) and in 3 tours as a ship’s captain.

17/ I would look my Sailors in the eye and tell them that of course I wanted them to communicate and ask for guidance, but that at a certain point, I had qualified them to be decision makers and if they needed to defend our ship, I would absolutely have their backs.

18/ The look of clarity on their faces at this point was a little heartbreaking – it told me that, at some level, they were worried about becoming scapegoats. I told that that was my job – I would be the scapegoat if one was needed.

19/ An ancillary observation (observation 3a?) I learned about communications is that Sailors will do almost anything for you if they know why you need it done. This can get lost if you have (or are) a “because I said so” kind of leader.

20/ We usually DO have time to explain ourselves – only rarely are you taking the conn and saving the ship (and hopefully that’s “never” not “rarely”). When you have time to explain your thinking to your subordinates, do so. They appreciate it and will do better for you.

21/ 4th big observation: mental health. We had a SPRINT (special psychiatric rapid intervention team) show up some few days after the attack. The team was an invaluable resource for the whole crew, but some – myself and some other DHs included – resisted.

22/ I remember telling the CO that I didn’t need that “touchy-feely” stuff, and that’s about as mad as I’ve ever seen him. His (fully valid) point was that we’d all need help and that as a leader, the LAST thing I could do would be delegitimize the SPRINT in the crew’s eyes.

23/ So I spoke with the team leader – and he was an immense help. Many years later, after a man overboard in a command tour, I had a SPRINT come on board and I told my crew about my experience with the SPRINT in Yemen, and encouraged them all to use the team.

24/ I’ve tried to not make this about me – no one needs a travelogue of what I did that day – but I’m eternally grateful for all the support I’ve had from so many over the years, which has allowed me to achieve my childhood dream – command of a warship – 3 times.

25/ I try to use my experience in COLE to keep me balanced. I do an imperfect job remembering my shipmates, but try to recall the difference between a bad day (12 OCT 2000) and every other type of day.

26/ Why I’m still doing this (first off, my wife lets me): the most memorable reenlistment I have ever conducted was in COLE’s CIC, hot and dark, in Aden. We have Sailors willing to serve after seeing what my Sailor saw – why wouldn’t I jump at the chance to lead them? Fin.

Addendum: I’m not sure I summed up well. I’ve been given another chance when others don’t always. I don’t want to waste it.