While it's true that Mao was Party Chairman & his cult was widespread at the outset of the Cultural Revolution, the notion that everything depended upon Mao is completely false. The idea of Mao's omnipotence disregards that in 1965-66 he found himself in the minority position.

Liu Shaoqi was head of the PRC and in the wake of the GLF he & officials like Deng Xiaopeng had taken over the reins of power. Mao was actively being sidelined, and his opponents held considerable power - enough to dismiss the notion that they were simple victims of Mao's whims.

Mao's GPCR strategy was couched in the fact that he did not command absolute power within the state apparatus, which is why he had to launch factional attacks at the top while relying upon the mass mobilization of ordinary Chinese. The image of the all powerful tyrant is false.

Additionally, the Red Guards are often treated as an analogue to the Hitler youth, but this disregards their spontaneous self organization. Even though the State assisted and manipulated many Red Guard groups, they proved impossible to control - defying the 'totalitarian' thesis.

Anti-communist adversaries of the Cultural Revolution have a stake in portraying the episode as pure bureaucratic manipulation by Mao, the all powerful despot. A close analysis, however, reveals a much more complex and fractured struggle in which Mao was initially disadvantaged.