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1/36. Over the last 12 days, the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia has been ongoing. For those of us in the region it was clear that it was coming.
2/36. The international community has ignored signals that were in public; arguably Covid-19 served as an excellent excuse for the lack of international engagement. Given the scale of fighting, mediator’s task has become even more challenging than before this war.
3/36.Their call for ceasefire is not heard in Baku – for it the only way to stop fighting would be a clear timetable of withdrawal of Armenian troops from adjacent territories, with internationally signed guarantees. Till it happens, no ceasefire call will be accepted.
4/36.Although this has sometimes been misinterpreted as only being considered, but not included to the text of the Madrid Principles, the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the seven adjacent territories has been one of the main topics of peace talks since the 1990s –
5/36. along with security guarantees and the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. We wrote about this in our report last December: https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-conflict/255-digging-out-deadlock-nagorno-karabakh
6/36. For instance, the proposals of the OSCE Minsk Group to the parties (step by step and package deals) in the mid of 90’s were formed on the basis of these three elements.
7/36.In other words, the issue of withdrawal was always there, even if you do not find it in the text of the Madrid Principles: https://www.osce.org/mg/51152
8/36. Therefore, when any politician or official in Armenia criticizes the Madrid Principles, Baku sees this as a rejection to its core demand for withdrawal, which has been one of the main elements of the peace talks since the 1990s.
9/36. If this stays Baku’s precondition for ceasefire, Armenia is left with little space to agree. On the other hand, Baku will not want any other deal fearing that with no real commitment supported by international community, its support to ceasefire will only allow Armenia
10/36. to rebuild its army and better prepare for new fighting. This is the security spiral both have entered. While Baku’s demand for withdrawal is clear, the question still arises as to what will be the fate of other two elements
11/36. of the basic principles (peacekeepers, the status of Karabakh). Both of them are important for official Yerevan.
12/36. The strain around ceasefire considerations further complicated the apparent and very visible lack of support to the talks in the Azerbaijani population.
13/36.The demands for the leadership is not to return to ‘fruitless’ talks, but to continue the war, which finally promises real results.
14/36.Therefore, the international calls for ceasefire are broadly seen as an attempt to disrupt Baku’s success and do not find support in the Azerbaijani public.
15/36. The average Azerbaijani believes that, following the signing of the ceasefire in 1994, the international community only delated the resolution of the conflict, instead simply managing it. As a result, diplomacy didn’t achieve anything.
16/36. This perception is especially strong among people who were displaced from Karabakh and the seven surrounding regions. Many have told me over the years that the only way to return to their homes would be through war.
17/36. Displaced Azerbaijanis feel that their stories, the injustice they suffered, and their desire to return to the homes that they fled a quarter century ago are not being covered in the international media.
18/36. With all this complexity in mind, no substantial talks will be still in sight for a long time. If the international actors are not able to present a clear proposal that can satisfy Baku’s precondition.
19/36. Even if ceasefire becomes somehow possible in the coming days, there will be another outbreak of fighting in several days.Even in the past, only calls for ceasefire did not help.
20/36 The international actors will have to find ways to address the demands of the conflict parties. Each party has its own expectations.They can start work on a new peace plan or principles, but the elements will be all the same: territories/withdrawal, security & status of NK
21/36.Now the problem is that instead of looking at the root of the conflict and the expectations of the parties, many people are now looking for the causes of the war in the ‘hands’ of third parties.
22/36. The framing of this conflict only as a ‘civilizational war’, ‘Turkey’s expansion’ or ‘Russia’s assertiveness’ is wrong. Because that frame - though useful to mobilize international attention - detracts from the other more real conflict dynamics.
23/36.This in turn makes it harder to understand and help the sides to end the conflict.
24/36. Much of the international media has been personalizing Turkey’s engagement in the conflict by portraying it has driven by Erdogan himself. But Turkish-Azerbaijani relations have a broad, long history.
25/36. Baku has sought to avoid the “big-brother-little-brother” relationship that characterized ties between Moscow and the non-Russian republics under the Soviet Union, and has tried to preserve its ability to make its own decisions.
26/36.The current war, and Turkey’s diplomatic and military assistance, has strengthened Azerbaijanis’ respect for the strategic alliance with Ankara.
27/36. There is a widespread misperception that Ankara is controlling Baku, and that if Turkey wanted, it could force Azerbaijan to cease its offensive.
28/36. But it is in fact the opposite: if Baku wanted to end the war, Ankara’s rhetoric could change and Turkish officials would start talking about the need to end the war and return to the negotiating table.
29/36. President Aliyev has announced that Turkey will be part of any peace process. It is well known how unacceptable this to Armenia. Baku sees Turkey’s role as a guarantor of any peace deal.
30/36.Before it was speculated that the Minsk Group Co-Chairs would be the guarantor countries - which means that if one of the parties violates the peace deal, guarantor countries will take certain steps.
31/36.Also Baku wants to see Turkey’s active participation in the Minsk Group format - not as a Co-chair, this is not the case, but as a supportive element.
32/36.Baku thinks that Turkey is one of the permanent members of the Minsk Group, and therefore the permanent members of the Minsk Group should be more active in the negotiations.
33/36. This is not understood as a change in the format lead by the Minsk Group co-chairs, but rather as a need to expand the role of other members. In other words, other permanent members outside Turkey should be active, including Sweden, Germany and other countries.
34/36. The most frequently asked question is why Russia is not intervening now. This is being compared to Moscow’s more pro-active mediation during past crisis situations.
35/36. The most obvious example of this was the provision of a ceasefire in 2016 with the direct intervention of Moscow in the four-day fighting between, which resulted in the largest post-war losses up until the current war.
36/36.An estimated 200 people were killed in the 2016 flare-up. In addition, Crisis Group has tracked around 300 other incidents and more than 250 casualties and wounded among military and civilians since 2015. https://www.crisisgroup.org/content/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-visual-explainer
37. In 2016, there was an incentive for Baku to return to the peace talks - you could call it the Lavrov plan, or a plan based on the use of some elements of the Madrid Principles.
38. At present, Russia has no such plan or constructive incentives to encourage Baku to return to the negotiating table.
39. As the fighting continues, the bodies of the dead Azerbaijani and Armenian soldiers need to be removed and returned. Second, the ongoing war has had and continues to have a devastating effect on the lives of civilians.
40. There are people in the areas close to the combat zone of Azerbaijan, as well as in the areas affected by the missile strikes, same is true about civilians in capital of breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh, Stepanakert.
41. Azerbaijani forces have targeted the capital of breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh, first using drones and then missiles. Many civilian fatalities and injuries have occurred, creating fear anger among the population and it forced the displacement.
42. A similarly deplorable situation prevails on the Azerbaijani side. Armenian forces targeted the second biggest city in Azerbaijan, Ganja.
43. The anti-missile system eliminated a few rockets, but one of them hit a house in the city. Later they targeted Mingacvevir – where there is a water reservoir that is critical for Azerbaijan’s national energy infrastructure. Damage risks catastrophic consequences.
44. Other cities have also been targeted. The targeting cities which are far from the conflict zone or indeed the main industrial cities effectively expands the conflict zone and creates more risk to civilian life.
45. (Final). That is why, no matter how unpopular the call for a ceasefire is, the warring parties need at least a ‘humanitarian ceasefire’ to resolve the issue with dead bodies and assist those in the conflict zone and near frontlines, who are in the greatest need right now.
