1/x PLA air patrols near Taiwan serve an expressly political purpose, but they also serve to better prepare the Chinese military for the use of force against Taiwan. In my latest for @globaltaiwan, I analyze PLA activities over the last month. http://globaltaiwan.org/2020/10/vol-5-issue-19/#MichaelMazza10072020

2/x PLA pilots have had a busy month

3/x Taiwan’s @MoNDefense has released somewhat detailed maps of PLA flight routes for every publicly acknowledged operation since September 16. The maps—all of which include the Pratas/Dongsha Islands—show that the PLA is not making things easy for the Rep. of China Air Force.

4/x Analysis of PLA flight paths suggests that testing Taiwan’s responses may be a key motivator of China’s recent activities. 19 traced six different, similarly spread-out flight routes.

5/x Even on days when only 2 PLA aircraft are involved—typically 2 Y-8s to Taiwan’s southwest—they're not flying identical routes, which presumably forces Taiwan to mobilize more assets to track them.

6/x On September 18, Taiwan had to respond to 18 aircraft flying five different routes spread out along a front measuring some 400 miles (my estimate). The 19 Chinese aircraft that took to the skies on September 19 traced six different, similarly spread-out flight routes.

7/x In all cases, MND described its response as scrambling fighters & deploying air defenses. MND hasn't provided further details, but monitoring ~20 enemy aircraft—whose intentions can't be presumed peaceful— operating in nearby skies is not a minor operation for the ROCAF.

8/x Put simply, China may have given Taiwan a peek at what a wartime operation might look like in order to learn how Taiwan would mount a defense.

9/x Beyond testing Taiwan’s defenses, the Chinese foreign ministry’s assertion that there is no median line in the Taiwan Strait may put an exclamation mark on the establishment of a new normal in the Taiwan Strait.

10/x If September and early October prove to be representative going forward, we have entered a period in which PLA warplanes seemingly cross the median line as a matter of course.

11/x If this is a new normal, it is one characterized by multiple PLA flight operations in and near the Taiwan Strait each month, w/ flights regularly crossing the median line or entering into Taiwan’s ADIZ.

12/x Why a new normal? 1. It serves to wear down Taiwan’s limited number of airframes, force the ROCAF to draw down spare parts supplies, and even tire out Taiwanese pilots...

13/x ...If China’s use of force is becoming more likely in the near term, then it behooves the PLA to stress the ROCAF now before Taiwan begins receiving deliveries of brand new F-16s in the mid-2020s.

14/x 2. China may hope to make the international community “numb” to its frequent ops in the skies near TW. When a couple dozen aircraft carrying out threatening operations is no longer striking to foreign observers, Beijing will undoubtedly be happy...

15/x ...In establishing a new, more hostile baseline, Beijing may believe it has more options for dialing pressure up and down in response to future developments.

16/x 3. A new normal marked by a higher operational tempo may make tactical surprise easier for the PLA to achieve. Taiwan can never be sure when what appears to be an exercise or routine patrol will turn out to be something more menacing...

17/x ...But when “routine” includes numerous aircraft flying at different altitudes and crossing the median line at various locations, it becomes easier for China to flip the switch from patrol to aggression and, potentially, catch Taiwan’s defenders off guard.

18/x Finally, China’s purported interest in the Pratas Islands may explain why Chinese aircraft have been flying in the southwestern corner of Taiwan’s ADIZ, which occurred nine times in September, three in October as of the time of writing, and throughout the summer as well.

19/x In some cases, those PLA flight routes have brought Chinese aircraft much closer to the Pratas Islands than to Taiwan itself (the two are separated by approximately 250 miles).

20/x Y-8 maritime patrol aircraft and H-6 bombers flew exclusively in the southwestern zone in September and so far in October, with Y-8s making at least nine appearances in those skies. Fighter jets occasionally did so as well last month.

21/x Y-8s may be soaking up intelligence on Taiwanese naval activities in waters separating Taiwan from the Pratas. They may, in particular, be on the hunt for submarines (Taiwanese or otherwise).

22/x Of Chinese planes utilized last month, H-6s appear to have flown closer to the Pratas than any other aircraft, perhaps suggesting they are practicing bombing runs on the islands.

23/x Finally, PLA fighter jets may be rehearsing routes they would fly to interdict forces heading from Taiwan to reinforce or defend the islands against a Chinese attack.

24/x The recent spate of Chinese military activities near Taiwan clearly serves an expressly political purpose—to pressure the Tsai government, to intimidate the Taiwanese people, and to convey seriousness of purpose to third parties.

25/x But it is easy to overlook the PLA’s potentially more narrow ends. Put simply, there is good reason to believe that the PLA is seeking to better prepare itself for the day when Beijing orders military action against Taiwan. /FIN