Something about this quote from a book on meta-analyses feels odd to me: "Contrary to common belief, [Hedges] findings showed that there was as much variability across studies in physics as there was in psychology. Furthermore, he found that the physical sciences used (1/n)

methods to combine findings across studies that were 'essentially identical' to meta-analysis." The book goes on to argue how meta-analyses shows that psychology's contributions do yield cumulative knowledge. However, this book was published back in 2004, (2/n)

pre-Replication crisis (and the ensuing debate about methods, theory, statistics, etc). I wonder how the current state of psychology changes how we interpret statements like that (and whether that varies across subfield). Meta-analytic thinking is great, but how does (3/n)

conversation about psychological science change how we understand this approach? I have no idea, although a quick search yields new articles on how we can improve how to conduct meta-analyses in a rigorous way. This is hard to gauge with so much noise. (fin)