Below is my @Attaqa2 article on #Iraq’s refining sector, published earlier in Arabic. I’m also sharing with friends/colleagues in #Lebanon after Iraq gasoil supplies (in aid) could not be used at power plants,& went instead to 🇱🇧 army. Few notes below not included in article. https://twitter.com/attaqa2/status/1312413754995417088
1)During online meeting with #Iraq oil minister Ihsan Ismaeel on Sept 5,organised by Iraqi Business Council, he said drop in oil prices/opec+restrictions, COVID-19-induced lockdown revealed weakness “of Iraqi economy and lack of real partnerships with investors.” He added:
2)That the type of these partnerships (based on TCS) with companies like ENI, BP… “prevented us from relying on these companies to assist us in such crises.”- Ihsan Ismaeel.(Similar struggle happened back in 2014, previous oil crisis).
3) It was during that meeting when minister Ismaeel spoke of attracting the private Iraqi sector to participate in some downstream project ideas that were proposed, such as a refinery in Zubair, and another one (petrochemical/Nebras).
4)The minister himself admitted few of the current obstacles to attract the private Iraqi sector, saying that “there is no legal framework to integrate them so that they can be part of the real economic (development) in the country.”
5)On issue of the downstream sector I spoke with Ruba Husari, who wrote about its problems many years back. Continued below:
6) In a 2012 commentary, Husari highlighted flaws in some downstream projects, including issue of “political priorities that dictated the location” of some refinery projects instead of focusing on market economics& prioritizing Iraq’s future role in energy sector- @iraqoilforum
7) Ahmed Mehdi from @OxfordEnergy said: “Growing anxieties around oil demand and product balances (especially the future of transport fuels and jet fuel) has led other Middle East refiners to reconfigure their refining strategies.” He added while referring to #Iraq:
8) “The refineries of tomorrow are about scale, capacity and efficiency: Iraq does not have these ingredients, so it should focus on upgrades to improve product yields to meet domestic demand (and avoid costly imports).”—Ahmed Mehdi.
9) Iraq imports products such as gasoil and gasoline. I used @Kpler data for 2019 and 2020 imports. https://bit.ly/33rMAoD 
10)On issue of gasoil imports, I also share this piece with #Lebanon friends and colleagues,especially after our Lebanese energy ministry announced that gasoil (aid) Iraq sent to Lebanon “was unsuitable”to be used at its power plants. Details in thread👇🏽. https://bit.ly/33rMAoD 
11) So due to poor quality (this is known especially re high sulfur %) gasoil volumes #Iraq sent to #Lebanon could not be used for power and reportedly went to Lebanese army instead. Some Lebanese energy officials should have known that, and most likely know. Continued: 👇🏽
12)An Iraq delegation was in #Beirut prior to the blast. If they discussed “fuel supplies” from Iraq then Lebanese officials should have asked about specifications (including sulfur content). I will have a new piece on this. Re-upping July article: https://bit.ly/33p9EEq 
13) Lastly, the volume Iraq sent (aid) cannot be compared to what an oil products tanker unloads in Lebanon for Jiyeh/Zouq plants. (First trucked shipment was ~ 4/4.5kb). Re quality of Iraq gasoil, details should have been revealed in 🇱🇧 when first shipment arrived early Aug.
End of thread. تصبحون على وطن.
You can follow @NoamRaydan.
Tip: mention @twtextapp on a Twitter thread with the keyword “unroll” to get a link to it.

Latest Threads Unrolled: