1. It took me a day or so to really read through the lines of the @EUCouncil statement on foreign relations vis-a-vis #Turkey. I am neither a legal expert nor a political analyst but here are some thoughts...

2. Turkey's strategic aims were 4:
a) To ensure no further sanctions damage its already fragile economy
b) To achieve concessions from the #EU ref. its claims
c) To engage in a bilateral dialogue with #Greece with an extended agenda &
d) To portray the matter as purely bilateral

3. #Turkey has achieved only the first goal and that partially. If one looks at the statement paragraph by paragraph and really disseminate it, it is easy to see why.

4. Paragraph 15 states the obvious (full solidarity with #Greece and #Cyprus) and the need for dialogue. Diplomatic statement which would not aggravate either side and setting the tone for what is to come.

5. Paragraph 16 apart from welcoming steps for confidence building puts an end to Turkey's aim of a broad dialogue. The direct exploratory talks shall be aimed at the delimitation of the Continental Shelf and EEZ of the two countries. This is the only issue for discussion as far

6. as Greece is concerned and an obvious rejection of Turkish claims that the dialogue needs to be broadened to other issues they believe they exist. The Greek thesis is supported fully by this paragraph.

7. Paragraph 17 once again adopts the Greek thesis fully. The only thing to be negotiated is the delimitation of Continental Shelf and EEZ. It also urges Turkey to consider Cyprus as a dialogue partner which Turkey refuses to engage with.

8. Paragraph 18 once again clearly states that the EU will be part of any future negotiation between Cyprus and Turkey thus refuting Turkey's claim that the issue is bilateral and the EU should not be involved due to perceived lack of impartiality.

9. Paragraph 18 is probably the most important. It might seem at first that there is desire from the EU to re-engage with Turkey but the "concessions" it offers is nothing new. Turkey has been trying for over 4 years to achieve a revamp of the Customs Union and get Visa free

10. travel for its citizens within the Union. The EU here promises vaguely nothing more than it promised 4 years ago when the deal was struck. Again, though both of the above were promised and Turkey expected them to come into force, now they are linked to Turkey falling in line.

11. Only provided that constructive efforts to stop illegal activities against Greece and Cyprus are sustained can Turkey hope to have any traction to what was already promised to them four years ago. To put it simply, Turkey will have to back down if it ever wishes for its

12. trade deal with the EU to modernize and expand and wishes to see its citizens having no restrictions in travelling to the Union. Considering that the EU allows citizens of places like Colombia visa free access to the EU, this is indeed a knock out blow to Turkish aspirations.

13. Considering that Erdogan will be very wary not to be seen to back down, #NoVisaLiberalization for Turkey will be a reality for many years to come and a trump card to be used by the Union for concessions on Turkey's part.

14. Paragraph 20 is written in a way to not threaten Turkey openly with sanctions since it does not mention the word per se. It implies the sanctions through reference to Articles 29 & 215. It sets a timetable once again for Turkey to breathe considering it is in no one's

15. interest to see Turkey totally collapse financially while European banks and corporations still have significant - albeit constantly reducing - exposure to Turkey's debt. Through careful wording it also reassures Turkey that it does not wish to harm it further and will only

16. do so if necessary. Since the Council's conclusions of October 2019 are mentioned, the EU clearly pushes the ball on Turkey's court and considers them responsible for any future steps.

17. Paragraph 21 once again refutes Turkey's argument about the "bilateral" nature of the problem. It clearly indicates the difficult situation as a multilateral problem between itself (through Greece and Cyprus) and Turkey. Turkey's efforts to disengage the EU from the process

18. has failed. Any problem between either Greece and Turkey or Cyprus and Turkey is automatically a problem between the Union and Turkey.

19. In conclusion, though Turkey has achieved one of its goals to postpone any further sanctions for the time being, this was a goal that was broadly expected and a goal that was partly shared by the Union - and all its members - as well. Turkey though failed to detach the

20. EU from its disagreements with Greece and Cyprus, failed to get concessions that hoped it was going to get as a matter of good will (Visa Free Travel and Updated Customs Union) and now sees the above strategic goals it had set being officially linked to its future conduct.

21. It is very tough to disagree that it has not gained much more than just breathing space. When your citizens and businesses are denied free movement of people and more favorable trade deals... the best you can hope for is for the status quo not to get worse. For now...